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Abstract
Starting from a naive investigation into the nature of experiments on a
physical system one can argue that states of the system should pair non-
degenerately with physical observables. This duality is closely related to that
between space and quantity, or, geometry and algebra. In particular, it is
grounded in the mathematical framework of both classical and quantum me-
chanics in the form of a pair of duality theorems by Gelfand and Naimark. In
particular, they allow us to construct a classical phase space, a compact Haus-
dorff space, for an algebra of classical observables. In the case of quantum
mechanics, this construction breaks down due to non-commutative nature of
the algebra of quantum observables. However, we can construct a Hilbert
space as the geometry underlying quantum mechanics.
Although this Hilbert space approach to quantum mechanics has proven
to be very effective, it does have its drawbacks. In particular, these arise when
one associates propositions to observables and investigates what kind of logical
structure they form. One way of doing this is by realising the propositions
as certain subsets of the phase space. In classical mechanics this procedure
indeed gives one the structure one would expect: a Boolean algebra. However,
although the case of quantum mechanics yields a nice mathematical structure,
an orthocomplemented lattice, the physical interpretation of this logic is rather
subtle, due to its crude notion of truth.
Recent work by Isham, Butterfield, Doering, Landsman, Spitters, Heunen
et al., attempting to address these problems, has led to an alternative method
for dealing with non-commutative algebras of observables and with that an
alternative framework for quantum kinematics. Moreover, it stays much closer
to our intuition from classical physics, in some sense, the motto being: Quan-
tum kinematics is exactly like classical kinematics, that is, not in Set, but
internal to some other topos!
This review paper gives a first introduction to the subject. It attempts to
provide a stepping stone towards more serious papers.
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1 Introduction
A theory of physics should be grounded in experiments: we formulate a hypothesis,
we do measurements on a prepared system by performing a certain experiment
on it and we compare the two to see if our experiment falsifies our hypothesis.
Somehow, these three concepts should correspond (not necessarily bijectively) to
the mathematical concepts of respectively proposition, state and observable. A
theory of physics should specify which systems, experiments and hypotheses we
deal with.
Starting from a naive investigation into the nature of experiments on a physical
system one can argue that, regardless of what the theory is, observables should pair
non-degenerately with states. One can argue that the observables naturally embed
in a C*-algebra on which the states act as linear functionals. The crucial difference
between classical and quantum mechanics is found in the Heisenberg uncertainty
relation, which entails that the quantum algebra should be a non-commutative one.
Theorems by Gelfand and Naimark allow one to construct a geometry, a so
called phase space, underlying the states: a compact Hausdorff space in the case
of quantum mechanics and a Hilbert space for quantum mechanics, given by the
GNS-construction. For this reason, it might be useful to think of classical mechanics
taking place internally in some category of topological spaces, while some category
of inner product spaces is rather the domain of quantum mechanics. I mean that
in the sense that the categorical structures at hand in both categories (e.g. objects,
morphisms, (co)limits, monoidally closed structure) have similar physical interpre-
tations.
This is a very reasonable but traditional approach for arguing the similarities
between classical and quantum mechanics. However, it has its drawbacks. In par-
ticular, one can associate propositions to observables and investigate what kind of
logical structure they form. One way of doing this is by realising the propositions
as certain subsets of the phase space. In classical mechanics this procedure indeed
gives one the structure one would expect: a Boolean algebra. However, although
the case of quantum mechanics, that was first dealt with by Birkhoff and Von Neu-
mann [5], yields a nice mathematical structure, an orthocomplemented lattice, that
has been intensively studied since, the physical interpretation of this logic is rather
subtle, due to its crude notion of truth.
This, more than anything else1, raises the question if the category of vector
spaces really is the right framework for a theory of quantum mechanics, at least
if one wants to do logic. Recent work by Isham, Butterfield, Doering, Landsman,
Heunen, Spitters et al. (e.g. [11, 20, 21, 22, 29]) suggests that a fundamentally
different approach might lead to new insights. In their work, the quantum phase
space is not a Hilbert space, but a compact Hausdorff space2 internal to a different
topos then Set, namely the topos of (co)presheaves over the poset of commutative
subalgebras of the algebra of observables3. One then constructs a quantum phase
space as a topological space internal to this topos by a version of the commutative
Gelfand-Naimark correspondence. In this way the GNS-construction and with it
the framework of vector spaces is avoided. This leads to an approach of quantum
logic that is, as I will argue, more reasonable from an operational point of view.
Moreover, apart from stressing a very strong parallel with classical mechanics, it
1Of course, there are also other issues with the treatment of quantum mechanics in Vect. For
instance, the GNS-construction, unlike the commutative Gelfand-Naimark correspondence, does
not extend to a functor. Even worse, it is non-canonical: the construction depends on the choice of
designated states. Of course, one can take all states, to obtain the universal GNS-representation.
However, due to size issues, this is often not a practical Hilbert space to deal with.
2Rather, a completely regular locale.
3As we will explain, this is strongly inspired by Bohr’s doctrine of classical contexts.
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also gives insight into the origin of fundamental differences between the classical
and quantum worlds.
However, there are currently two competing approaches that realise this idea
in a slightly different way. The first approach, which I shall call ‘the contravariant
approach’ was developed by Isham and Butterfield and later by Doering and Isham,
uses the topos of presheafs on the poset of subalgebras. The second ‘covariant
approach’, due to Heunen, Landsman and Spitters, uses the topos of copresheaves
on this poset. The two approaches were recently extensively compared by Wolters
[43] and appear to be compatible in a number of ways.
This review paper attempts to give a brief outline of the subject, culminating in
a comparison of the contravariant and covariant approach. Rather than to explore
new territory, the aim of this text is to give an overview, leaving out technicalities
if possible; focussing on ideas rather than calculations. All omitted details can be
found in the excellent papers of the bibliography.
“Well, I never heard it before,” said the Mock Turtle; “but it sounds
uncommon nonsense.”
lalalalalalalalalalalalalallalalalalala (Lewis Caroll’s ‘Alice’s Adventures
lalalalalalalalalalalalalallalalalalalalalain Wonderland’, Chapter X.)
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2 Naive Physics (Syntax)
Let us forget about the standard formalism for theories of physics for a moment.
In this informal paragraph we shall take a naive operational point of view (in the
sense of Bridgman), to motivate a minimal core of syntax4 that should get an in-
terpretation in each theory of physics. We hope that this philosophical background
will help the reader to appreciate the topos approaches to quantum physics.
Physical theories originate from the experimental practice. We perform experiments
on prepared systems to yield outcomes5: we have sorts6 {systems}, {experiments}
and P{outcomes} and a function symbol
{systems}, {experiments} Measurement−→ {outcomes}.
The same information as the outcome of all measurements should be contained in
the truth status of all hypotheses7: we can also formulate physics using a function
4We will not make a strict destinction between syntax and semantics. In particular, we shall
not work out the details of the syntactical side of the story. Instead we hope that our handwavy
comments in this paragraph will be enough to transfer some intuitions about the formalism used
in theories physics.
5The sort {outcomes} will be interpreted as some object of real numbers in a topos.
6In the sense of many-sorted logics.
7In an interpretation in a topos this is obtained from the last line by the counit of the exponential
adjunction.
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symbol
{systems}, {experiments},P{outcomes} Hypothesis−→ Ω.
Here, Ω is some abstract sort of truth values8, the sort P{outcomes} represents the
idea of an object of subobjects of {outcomes} and the term Hypothesis(X,Y,∆)
should be read as the statement “If we perform experiment X on system Y , we will
obtain a measurement value in ∆ ∈ P{outcomes}.”.
From a physical point of view it is clear that these pairings will generally be
degenerate in some sense. Indeed, there might be two different experimental pro-
cedures (described in some alphabet) that yield the same measurement results on
all physical systems or equivalently assign the same truth value to all associated
hypotheses. In that case, we like to think that we are actually measuring the same
‘physical quantity’. The equivalence classes under this equivalence relation should
correspond 1-1 with what physicists call observables9. Let us write A for the sort of
observables. Similarly, we would like to identify certain (descriptions of) systems,
when they agree on all hypotheses, involving all experiments (or observables). We
say that they are in the same state. We write S for the sort of all states. These
identifications should induce pairings: i.e. function symbols
A,S −→ {outcomes}
and
S ,A,P{outcomes} Proposition−→ Ω.
of which the interpretation should be non-degenerate in some sense. What is im-
portant is the result that from purely practical, syntactical considerations it follows
that states and observables should be dual to each other.
There is also a reasonable way to construct a logical structure out of these data.
If we fix terms a of sort A and ∆ of sort P{outcomes} in the function symbol
Proposition, we obtain a function symbol
S
[a∆]−→ Ω.
This should be interpreted as a subobject of the object of states10. We note that the
propositions of this form should give rise to a kind of Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
related to the theory of physics, generated by the operations induced from SubS .
3 Canonical Formalism (Semantics)
3.1 C*-algebras and their States in Physics
Of course, we will not be able to derive many consequences from the fuzzy funda-
ments of the previous section. We have to narrow down the concepts of observable
and state. We therefore turn to the theory of C*-algebras, where these ideas take
concrete form. The formalisms we will set up in this section for classical and quan-
tum kinematics are among the canonical ones, being particularly popular among
8In the case of classical mechanics, it is clear that it should just be the set {⊥,>}. In our topos
interpretation of quantum kinematics (i.e. all matters accept dynamics) it will be the subobject
classifier of another topos.
9One can compare the distinction between experiments and observables with that between
functions in intension and functions in extension.
10In the formalism we will set up, we will also interpret these propositions as certain specific
observables. The idea is that in practice (in the interpretation) we have a mono Ω ↪−→ {outcomes}
(for instance, {0, 1} ↪−→ R) so we can identify subobjects of S with certain arrows S −→
{outcomes}. If we choose our object of observables big enough, we may hope that these arrows
are included. (Recall that under currying we have a map A −→ {outcomes}S .)
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mathematical physicists. The reader might want to think of them as an attempt at
constructing a semantics representing the core syntax we presented in the previous
paragraph.
There exist good physical (operational) arguments to support the idea that the
set of observables can be embedded in (the set of self-adjoint elements of) a C*-
algebra (over C ), which we shall also denote by A. Here a polynomial p(a) in a ∈ A
gets the interpretation of first performing a measurement of a and then applying
the polynomial to the measurement outcome. The operational interpretations of
a+ b and a · b for arbitrary observables a and b are more subtle. The measurement
of the first observable might alter the state of the system we are trying to measure
and therefore disturb the measurement of the second observable. This certainly
does not agree with the interpretation of the sum of observables we have in existing
theories of physics. Identically prepared states do not really solve this problem
either, according to the various no-cloning theorems we have in physics (e.g. [15]).
In this picture states ω are interpreted to give the expectation value ω(a) for
measurements of observables a on a corresponding system. One can argue that these
should form linear functionals on A. (Linearity over polynomials in one observable
at least should be clear.) To agree with the physical intuition of an expectation
value, we want states to be positive functionals, i.e. they should yield positive
results on positive elements of A (i.e. elements of the form a∗a). Then the self-
adjoint elements of A will be the candidates for observables. In this interpretation
the zero-th power of any observable should have expectation value 1 for any state.
Indeed, ω(a) = ω(aa0) = ω(a)ω(a0) = ω(a)ω(1), for all ω ∈ S , a ∈ A. This means
that ω(1) = 1, for all ω. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 1 (State on a C*-algebra). With a state on a C*-algebra we mean a
positive normalised linear functional. It is easily checked that these form a convex
set. The extreme points of this set are called pure state, while the term mixed state
is used to refer to a state that might not be pure11.
One can show that ‖a‖ = supω∈S |ω(a)|. Moreover, it is easily verified that
the states separate the elements of A and conversely, as desired. I hope that this
brief digression gives the reader enough motivation to believe that a C*-algebra
framework is not too restrictive for a theory of physics. An excellent motivation of
the use of C*-algebras in physics (including all the details I omitted) can be found
chapter 1 of [41].
3.2 Classical and Quantum C*-algebras
As it will turn out, the C*-algebra of observables of classical mechanics should be
commutative, while we use a non-commutative C*-algebra to describe quantum
mechanics. Strocchi [41] gives a very nice argument for this fact, starting from
Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. It goes as follows. Recall we gave a state ω on
a C*-algebra A the following physical interpretation: if a is a self-adjoint element
of A, then we interpret ω(a) as the expectation value of a measurement of A on a
system in state ω. Note that therefore the variance ∆ω(a)
2 would be ω(a2)−ω(a)2.
Now, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation states that
∆ω(qj)∆ω(pj) ≥ ~/2,
where we write qj and pj for respectively the position and momentum observables
in the j-th direction. Since the bound given by the Heisenberg uncertainty relation
11This terminology reflects the physics. Pure states represent the physical idea of a state of
which we have complete knowledge. That is, as far as our theory of physics allows this. (E.g.
in quantum mechanics, even pure states exhibit statistical behaviour.) Mixed states represent
generally statistical (ignorance) ensembles of states.
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is independent of the state, it is natural to assume that its origin can be found in
the algebra of observables.
Let a, b ∈ A such that a∗ = a and b∗ = b. Since (a− iλb)(a+ iλb) is a positive
element, positivity of ω gives us that
ω(a2) + |λ|2ω(b2) + iλω([a, b]) ≥ 0,
where [a, b] := ab − ba. This tells us that the last term is real and therefore, by
positive definiteness of the quadratic form in λ 4ω(a2)ω(b2) ≥ |ω(i[a, b])|2 or, put
differently,
∆ω(a)∆ω(b) ≥ |ω([a, b])|/2.
It is natural to demand that this algebraic bound that follows from the mathemat-
ical formalism coincides with the experimentally determined bound given by the
Heisenberg uncertainty relation: ~ = |ω([qj , pj ])|, for all states ω. This implies that
[qj , pk] = ±i~δjk1,
where δjk denotes the Kronecker delta. Therefore, our conclusion is that the algebra
of quantum observables should be a non-commutative one12.
Our algebra of observables is a very abstract entity. As is often the case in al-
gebra, we would like to think of the elements of our algebra as functions of some
kind. The typical example of a commutative C*-algebra one might come up with
is perhaps C and if one has a bit more fantasy some algebra of bounded functions
from a fixed space to C . In the non-commutative case one would perhaps think
of an algebra of matrices with complex coefficients or more generally an algebra
A ⊂ B(H) of bounded operators on some Hilbert space H. As it turns out, these
are, in fact, the only examples. This was proved by Gelfand, Naimark (and I. Segal).
Theorem 3.1 ((Commutative) Gelfand-Naimark theorem,[32]). Write cCStar for
the category of commutative complex C*-algebras and CHaus for that of compact
Hausdorff topological spaces. Then the functors
cCStarop
C(−,C )

Max
CHaus
define an equivalence of categories, where C(−,C ) ⊂ Set(−,C ) sends Σ to the
algebra of continuous functions from Σ to C and Max sends an algebra A to its
maximal spectrum, equipped with the Zariski topology and an algebra morphism
A
f−→ A′ to a continuous map Max(A′) Max(f)−→ Max(A) that sends a maximal ideal
to its inverse image under f .
Maximal ideals in a C*-algebra correspond precisely with *-homomorphisms to
C , or pure states. (See theorem 4.7.) When viewed this way, the maximal spectrum
is commonly referred to as the Gelfand spectrum of the C*-algebra.
We like to think of this space Σ as the phase space from classical mechanics13
and of C(Σ,C ) as the algebra of observables. Respecting the duality between states
12This heuristic argument also shows one of the weaknesses of the C*-algebra formalism. Indeed,
if one has two self adjoint elements q, p ∈ A such that [q, p] = λ · 1, where λ is some constant,
one easily derives that ‖q‖ ‖p‖ ≥ n|λ|/2, for all n ∈ N, i.e. this cannot happen. In practice this
means that either q or p will be an unbounded operator, thereby falling outside our C*-algebra
formalism. However, one can argue that by the practical restrictions on our measurements and
because of relativistic considerations, the observables we measure in practice are in fact bounded
approximations of q and p. Cf. the next footnote.
13A physicist might object that we the phase space in clssical mechanics is usually a cotangent
bundle of some manifold Q and therefore not compact. The compactness of our space reflects the
fact that we started out with a normed algebra of observables. This means that we restricted our
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and observables, we should also explain what the geometric analogue of a mixed
state is. The answer is given by a celebrated theorem by Riesz and Markov. This
brings us back to the situation of states as probability distributions on the phase
space that is common in (statistical) classical physics.
Theorem 3.2 (Riesz-Markov,[41]). Let Σ be a compact Hausdorff space. Then,
there is a 1-1 correspondence between states ω on C(Σ,C ) and radon measures14
µω on Σ, the correspondence being
ω(f) =
∫
Σ
fdµω.
The construction for non-commutative C*-algebras is not nearly as nice, as it is
non-functorial.
Theorem 3.3 (GNS-construction,[41]). Any C*-algebra A is *-isomorphic to an
algebra of bounded operators A′ ⊂ B(H) on some15 Hilbert space H. There is a
canonical16 construction to realise this, called the (universal) GNS-representation.
This construction is an argument commonly given in favour of the Hilbert space
framework in which quantum mechanics is usually dealt with. States, as physicists
know them, fit in this framework as follows.
Corollary 3.4. Let A be a C*-algebra with any representation A pi−→ B(H) on a
Hilbert space H. Then every trace 1 operator ρ on H defines a state ωρ of A by
ωρ(a) := tr(ρa).
Conversely, if we take pi to be the universal GNS-representation every state in fact
arises (non-uniquely) in such a way, the pure states precisely corresponding to traces
against one dimensional projections, or if you will, points of the Hilbert space.
Given a general representation A −→ B(H) of a C*-algebra A, however, our no-
tion of a state is strictly more general then that of states that are obtained from trac-
ing against positive operators. The difference mostly lies in the fact that our states
are only finitely additive, while in physics complete additivity is convention, i.e.
for every mutually orthogonal family of projections Pi ∈ A ω(
∑
i Pi) =
∑
i ω(Pi).
Although our concept of a state might thus be a bit more general than the states
physicists use in practice, it does not differ much on a conceptual level. On the
other hand, it is a lot easier to deal with, mathematically. This exhibits the physi-
cal relevance of the abstract algebraic concept of a state on a C*-algebra which we
shall be using in the rest of this paper.
3.3 Propositions
3.3.1 Classical Propositions
To motivate the rest of this paper, which shall mostly be on quantum logic, we give
a brief account of the logic associated to classical mechanics.
observables to be bounded functions on our phase space. This is a reasonable thing to do since we
only expect our classical physics to be applicable in a relatively small region of space. (On large
distances general relativistic effects become relevant.) Similarly, we do not expect classical physics
to hold for particles with very high momentum. In that domain one would also have to use a theory
of relativity. One way to think of the relation between our compact phase space Σ and the usual
space T ∗Q from physics is that C∗(T ∗Q,C ) ∼= C(Σ,C ), or equivalently Σ = Max(C∗(T ∗Q,C )),
where C∗(Σ,C ) is the C*-algebra of bounded functions Σ −→ C . Note that this is just the
definition of the Stone-Cˇech compactification! Since T ∗Q is locally compact Hausdorff it embeds
in Σ as an open subspace (by the unit of the Stone-Cˇech-adjunction). [32]
14That is, finite regular measures.
15That we can choose to be separable if A is.
16We take the sum of the GNS-representations corresponding to all pure states.
11
Let us approach the matter naively. When we do experiments on a classical
mechanical system, we formulate hypotheses about it. It is not uncommon to ma-
nipulate these hypotheses by logical operations such as negations, disjunctions, con-
junctions and, very importantly, if we want to test physical theories, implications17.
The idea is that we should be able to translate these logical operations in our met-
alanguage to operations in the mathematical framework of classical mechanics. In
section 2, we argued that it is reasonable to expect to embed propositions in the
powerset of our set of states. In fact, we will embed them in the powerset of the set
S of pure states. Naively, we would expect to find a logical structure in classical
mechanics that reflects our classical intuition: a Boolean algebra. One might hope
to realise this structure as a Boolean subalgebra of PS .
To proceed, we take an operational point of view again. A hypothesis about a
classical mechanical system should be verifiable, or, at least, falsifiable18. It would
therefore typically be a statement of the form “If we measure observable a on our
system, the outcome will be in ∆ ⊂ R.”. This can equivalently be put in terms of ge-
ometry (Gelfand-Naimark, Riesz-Markov) as “The state of our system has support
in a−1(∆) ⊂ Σ.”
Now, a mathematician would ask: “How free are we in the choice of ∆?”. One
reasonable answer is that ∆ should be open in R. This gives us O(Σ) as the object
representing our classical logic. However, in general, this is only a Heyting algebra:
the rule of the excluded middle fails. Heunen, Landsman, Spitters suggest in [29]
that it almost holds: we would never be able to establish its failure by performing
experiments. Indeed, they reason, if P is a proposition and U ∈ O(Σ) is the corre-
sponding open set, then U∪(X \U)o would be the open set representing P ∨¬P and
this set is topologically big (dense) X. However, seeing how physical probabilities
correspond with certain integrals on Σ w.r.t. some Borel measure, I would say that
being ‘big’ in a measure theoretic sense is a better criterion. Note that U ∪ (X \U)o
might not have full measure to conclude that this is not the most reasonable logic
we could associate to classical mechanics. The law of the excluded middle could
really fail in a physically detectable way in this logic.
If one wants to end up with a Boolean algebra, therefore, it might be better to
allow ∆ to be a general Borel measurable subset of R and to replace A = C(Σ,C )
by the C*-algebra of essentially bounded functions L∞((Σ, µ),C ), with respect to
some Borel measure µ on Σ. Then our logic is given by the Borel σ-algebra (modulo
null-sets)19.
Note that we have a canonical map C(Σ,C ) ↪−→ L∞((Σ, µ),C , ) that is injective
if µ is non-degenerate. [42] Moreover, the logic of our classical mechanics does not
only follow from the geometry. It can equivalently be described in terms of algebra
as the Boolean algebra Π(A) of self-adjoint idempotents20 in L∞((Σ, µ),C ). These
results can be stated more generally as the following non-trivial theorem. (In our
particular case H = L2((Σ, µ), C) and L∞((Σ, µ),C ) ⊂ B(H) (by multiplication)
is our Von Neumann algebra.)
17As we shall see the lack of a suitable notion of an implication is one of the major drawbacks
of Von Neumann’s quantum logic.
18On the level of logic, one can argue that this difference is not that important. Indeed, verifi-
cation of a proposition would coincide with the falsification of its negation.
19Another obvious way of getting a Boolean algebra, that is mentioned in some references such
as [29], would to consider all subsets of Σ. However, this choice does not seem to reflect very
well what can be established by experiments, according to the measure theoretic interpretation of
states given by the Riesz-Markov theorem.
20One can check that these form a complete Boolean algebra, where the meet is given by the
ring multiplication. [39] In this case thse are of course precisely the characteristic functions of
measurable subsets of Σ.
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Definition 2 (Von Neumann algebra). A C*-subalgebra is called a Von Neumann
algebra if it admits an embedding into B(H) for some Hilbert space H, such that it
is equal to its double commutant. We will think of of Von Neumann algebras as a
non-full subcategory21 VNeu of CStar where the ∗-homomorphisms are additionally
required to be continuous in the ultraweak topologies22.
In this context it might be easiest to think of Von Neumann algebras as certain
C*-algebras that have enough self adjoint idempotents. In fact, these generate a
Von Neumann algebra in the sense that the double commutant of Π(A) is A. [42]
This abundance of projections23 will make our life easier in many ways24.
The step of passing from C(Σ,C ) to L∞((Σ, µ),C ) is a bit unsatisfactory, since
it depends on the choice of a measure µ. The motivation for this construction was
that we wanted to add self-adjoint idempotents (specifically, characteristic functions
of measurable sets) to the algebra of observables, so we could obtain an interesting
logic from the algebra. As it turns out, there is a more canonical way of doing this.
Theorem 3.5 ([34],[42]). VNeu ↪−→ CStar is a (non-full) reflective subcategory.
Its reflector is called the universal enveloping Von Neumann algebra construction. It
is given by applying the universal GNS-representation and taking the bicommutant,
or equivalently, taking the second continuous dual space.
The result for our particular case A = C(Σ,C ) indeed reflects our intuition.
Theorem 3.6. Recall that the Radon measures on Σ form a preorder under the
relation of absolute continuity. L∞((Σ,−),C ) defines a functor from the opposite
of this preorder to the category of complex Banach spaces. Then C(Σ,C )∗∗ ∼=
lim←−L
∞((Σ,−),C ). This is a Von Neumann algebra under the induced multiplica-
tion.
Proof (sketch). It is well known from the construction of Riesz-Markov that C(Σ,C )∗ ∼=
lim−→L
1((Σ,−),C ), where L1((Σ,−),C ) is again a functor from the opposite of the
preorder of Radon measures to the category of complex Banach spaces. Now, the
continuous dual space functor sends colimits to limits (this is easy to see if one con-
siders it as a contravariant endofunctor of the category of topological vector spaces,
of which that of Banach spaces is a full subcategory) and therefore C(Σ,C )∗∗ ∼=
lim←−(L
1((Σ,−),C ))∗. Now, according to [42], (L1((Σ,−),C ))∗ ∼= L∞((Σ,−),C ).
Finally, as a consequence of Hahn-Banach C(Σ,C ) is w*-dense in its bidual space.
Therefore, by continuity the multiplication on C(Σ,C )∗∗, that we know to exist by
the previous theorem, has to coincide with the one induced from the multiplications
on each of the L∞((Σ, µ),C ).
21We will not think of a Hilbert space as being part of the data of a Von Neumann algebra. The
reader should note that in literature these Von Neumann algebras without an embedding in some
B(H) are also known as W*-algebras.
22This is the initial topology with respect to the family of maps B(H) tr(ρ−)−→ C , for trace class
operators ρ ∈ B(H). It turns out that this topology does not depend on the choice of the Hilbert
space[42]
23In the light of the universal GNS-representation, it is reasonable to call self-adjoint idempotents
projections.
24To name a few things:
1. By the spectral theory for Von Neumann algebras, we can extend many results about
projections to all normal elements, so in particular to all observables.
2. The projections will represent the propositions about our physical system. The abundance
of projections tells us that this logic contains a lot of information about the system.
3. This logic will also be convenient from a calculational point of view: it is a complete lattice.
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Note that this space contains
⋂
µ L
∞((Σ, µ),C ), so in particular all bounded
measurable functions from Σ to C .25 Therefore, the characteristic functions define
an order embedding of the Borel sigma-algebra into the self-adjoint idempotents of
this Von Neumann algebra26. So effectively, what we have done is add those char-
acteristic functions to C(Σ,C ) and embed the result in a C*-algebra. One might
wonder how the abundance of projections in a Von Neumann algebra translates into
properties of the spectrum.
Theorem 3.7 (Gelfand-Duality for commutative Von Neumann algebras). The
equivalence of theorem 3.1 that restricts to an equivalence between the opposite of the
category of commutative Von Neumann algebras and the category of hyperstonean27
spaces, where the maps are open continuous functions. [42]
To accentuate the relation with measure theory, we also mention the following
classification.
Let Σ be a locally compact Hausdorff space and µ a radon measure on Σ, then
L∞((Σ, µ),C ) is a Von Neumann algebra. Conversely, every Von Neumann alge-
bra arises in this way. [40]
From the fact that the Gelfand spectrum of a Von Neumann algebra is a Stone
space, one finds a second way of constructing a Boolean algebra out of it. Recall
Stone’s representation theorem for Boolean algebras.
Theorem 3.8 (Stone-Duality,[32]). Write Bool for the category of Boolean alge-
bras and homomorphisms and write Stone for the category of totally disconnected28
compact Hausdorff spaces and continuous functions. Then the functors
Boolop
Pcl

Spec
Stone
define an equivalence of categories, where Pcl ⊂ P sends Σ to the Boolean algebra of
clopen subsets and Spec sends a Boolean algebra B to its prime spectrum, equipped
with the Zariski topology and an algebra morphism B
f−→ B′ to a continuous map
Spec(B′)
Spec(f)−→ Spec(B) that sends an ideal to its inverse image under f .
It turns out that this is this gives us Π(A) again. We formulate this in terms of
their spectra.
Theorem 3.9 ([4]). The Gelfand spectrum of a Von Neumann algebra coincides
with the Stone spectrum of the Boolean algebra of its self-adjoint idempotents: Spec◦
Π = Max : VNeuop −→ Stone
In this sense, (commutative) Von Neumann algebras are suitable algebras of
observables for classical mechanics, from a logical point of view. We can reconstruct
the observables from their associated logic: C(Spec(Π(A)),C ) ∼= A.
25Of course, it contains a lot more. For instance, objects that do not have an interpretation as
a function.
26The self-adjoint idempotents of a Von Neumann algebra are a complete lattice, while the Borel
sigma-algebra may only be countably complete. So this embedding is some sort of completion (by
objects that do not have an interpretation as subsets of Σ).
27i.e. extremally disconnected and admitting a perfect measure. What is important here is that
it is a stronger condition that being Stone (see below).
28Spaces that have no non-trivial connected subspaces.
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3.3.2 Von Neumann’s Quantum Propositions
The construction in the previous paragraph was a contrived such that it would
yield a logic for classical mechanics that agrees with our classical (Boolean) intu-
ition. Things get more interesting if we try to do something similar for quantum
mechanics, as it is not a priori clear that our classical logic is suitable at all to deal
with statements about quantum mechanical systems. The first thorough account of
such a quantum logic was given by Birkhoff and Von Neumann in [5]. The approach
that is now standard is only a minor alteration of their original one29. [25]
Inspired by the discussion of classical logic, we might postulate that the poset
Π(A) of self-adjoint idempotents of our C*-algebra of quantum observablesA should
model quantum logic, playing the role of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. Mimicking
the situation in classical mechanics, we define a partial order on Π(A) by a ≤ b iff
ab = a. (It then follows that ba = b∗a∗ = (ab)∗ = a∗ = a.)30 However, in general,
A might not contain enough projections to give rise to an interesting logic, just like
C(Σ,C ) did not in the classical case. Therefore, we should embed A in some Von
Neumann algebra, the quantum analogue of L∞(Σ,C ), if you will.
One way of doing is this, if A arises as an subalgebra of B(H) for some Hilbert
space H is just taking its double commutant. A canonical method would be using
the universal GNS-representation for A to embed it in B(H) for some Hilbert space
H, thus computing the universal enveloping Von Neumann algebra. Then we have
the following.
Theorem 3.10 ([39]). The lattice Π(A) of projections in a Von Neumann algebra
A is a complete orthomodular31 lattice, w.r.t. its natural order. Moreover, it is
distributive if and only if A is commutative. In particular, in the non-commutative
case, the adjoint functor theorem tells us that it does not have an implication.
Proof. All properties are straightforward verifications, except the completeness.
This is an elementary consequence of the (non-trivial) bicommutant theorem, which
I have therefore used to define what a Von Neumann algebra is.
Note that a faithful representation of A on a Hilbert space H defines an or-
der embedding Π(A) into the Grassmannian Π(H) of closed linear subspaces of H.
We see that this quantum logic resembles the situation in classical mechanics quite
closely in terms of geometry: the propositions are given by the closed linear sub-
spaces of H (rather than the measurable subsets). The meet is given by intersection
and the join by closed linear span. Although an implication is lacking, Birkhoff and
Von Neumann did define a negation on Π(A), given by the orthocomplement (or,
p 7→ 1− p in terms of algebra).
Like we anticipated in our informal syntactical discussion in section 2, this logic
should play the role of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra and its propositions should
arise as (in some sense provable) equivalence classes of sequents > ` a∆, for vari-
ables a of sort A and ∆ of sort PR. In practice this goes as follows.
Let a ∈ A ⊂ B(H), a∗ = a be a quantum observable and let ∆ be a Borel
measurable subset of R. Then we can form a proposition [a∆] ∈ Π(A) as the
projection in the spectral decomposition of a corresponding to ∆ ∩ σ(a) ⊂ σ(a),
where σ(a) denotes the spectrum of a. Conversely, every p ∈ Π(A) is of this form.
Indeed, take a = p and ∆ = R.
29It is now generally accepted that quantum logic should be only orthomodular, not modular,
i.e. distributivity fails in an even stronger sense.
30Geometrically speaking, i.e. if A ⊂ B(H), this order is the inclusion of subspaces.
31This weakend law of distributivity says that if A ≤ B and A⊥ ≤ C, then A ∨ (B ∧ C) =
(A∨B)∧ (A∨C), where we write A⊥ for 1−A (in the algebraic sense). Note that is not a Heyting
implication.
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A first indication for the physical interpretation of this logic is found in the
following nice but quite non-trivial analogy32 with the Riesz-Markov representation
of states from classical mechanics.
Theorem 3.11 (Mackey-Gleason,[8, 7, 9] (original references),[26] (complete proof)).
Let A be a Von-Neumann algebra. Every state ω on A restricts to a finitely additive
measure on Π(A). That is, a map Π(A) µω−→ [0, 1] such that
1. µω(>) = 1;
2. µω(x) + µω(y) = µω(x ∧ y) + µω(x ∨ y).
If A has no type I2-summands, this assignment defines a bijection between states33
on A and finitely additive measures on Π(A).
We see that the choice of a state associates a number to every quantum proposition.
The Born interpretation (one of the cornerstones of quantum mechanics that gives
the formalism its empirical content) precisely states that these numbers should be
interpreted as (frequentist) probabilities and that34, for a state A ω−→ C , the
probability of measuring a value in ∆ ⊂ R for the observable a is
Probω(a∆) = µω([a∆]) = ω([a∆]).
As it turns out, we identify a quantum proposition with all the pure states for
which it is true with certainty. The Born rule tells us that, for a pure state, which
we shall represent by a unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ H, this probability is
Prob|ψ〉(a∆) = 〈ψ|[a∆]|ψ〉.
We see that
[a∆]H = {|ψ〉 ∈ H |Prob|ψ〉(a∆) = 1}.
Similarly,
[a∆]⊥H = {|ψ〉 ∈ H |Prob|ψ〉(a∆) = 0}
= [a 6∆]H = {|ψ〉 ∈ H |Prob|ψ〉(a 6∆) = 1}.
Note that the negation p⊥ does not say “p is not true”, but rather “p is false!”. (In
jargon: we have a choice negation, rather than an exclusion negation.)35 We see
that pure states do not define morphisms Π(A) −→ {0, 1}, as one might expect from
experience with classical mechanics36. Some propositions are neither true nor false
for a state |ψ〉. We will later see that even more is true: even if we replace {0, 1}
by some other Boolean algebra (or a general distributive lattice, for that matter)
and lower our expectations we still can’t assign truth values to the propositions.
(Jargon: quantum logic fails to admit Boolean-valued models.) We see that an
ignorance interpretation of quantum probabilities is an unacceptable point of view.
32One should immediately note however, that a big difference is that quantum pure states do
not correspond to the two valued measures: even pure states exhibit non-deterministic behaviour.
33In fact, it always defines a bijection between quasi-states and these finitely additive measures.
(See definition 3)
34This is a rather reasonable assumption, since this is precisely our interpretation in the case of
classical mechanics.
35All propositions thus are of the form Prob|ψ〉(a∆) = λ, where λ is 0 or 1. Other probabilities
are not included in the logic. One might argue that this makes this quantum logic a bit crude,
as propositions with other values for λ would be just as valid from an operational point of view.
However, there still is no consensus as to how to include propositions of this form in the logic. [39]
36Indeed, there pure states define a homomorphism of complete Boolean algebras from the logic
to the two-value Boolean algebra.
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(See theorem 4.3.) Surprisingly, quantum logic does satisfy the law of the excluded
middle: p ∨ p⊥ = >.
One sees the origin of this curiosity, not by investigating at the meet, which is
perfectly well-behaved,
[a∆] ∧ [a′∆′]H = {|ψ〉 ∈ H |Prob|ψ〉(a∆) = 1 and Prob|ψ〉(a′∆′) = 1}
= {|ψ〉 ∈ H |Prob|ψ〉(a∆ and a′∆′) = 1}),
but rather the join
[a∆] ∨ [a′∆′]H = {|ψ〉 ∈ H |Prob|ψ〉(a∆ or a′∆′) = 1})
6= {|ψ〉 ∈ H |Prob|ψ〉(a∆) = 1 or Prob|ψ〉(a′∆′) = 1}.
Even if Prob|ψ〉(a∆) is neither 0 nor 1, i.e. |ψ〉 /∈ [a∆]H and |ψ〉 /∈ ¬[a∆]H, then
still |ψ〉 ∈ ([a∆] ∨ ¬[a∆])H = H. We see that there is some friction between this
quantum concept of truth and our intuition.
Now, we should stop to think about the issue of epistemology versus ontology: can
we give an operational meaning to these propositions? Since measurements in gen-
eral destroy a quantum state, this is a subtle issue, most notably the interpretation
of the conjunction and disjunction.
The principal problem is that we cannot perform many measurements in a suc-
cessive fashion to verify or falsify our proposition, as measurements change our
quantum state. Ideally, therefore, we would like to prepare many copies of the same
state and perform parallel experiments. Unfortunately, due to various no cloning
theorems this is still not possible in principle. [36] We can however prepare al-
most identical states37 and perform experiments on them. (See for instance [24] for
the theoretical principle and [12] for a recent experimental realisation of the proce-
dure.) In this way, we can make sense of a probabilistic interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
However, the issue of conjunctions and disjunctions remains: which proposition
do we verify first? (In quantum mechanics, this will make a big difference38!) Of
course, ∧ and ∨ should be symmetric, so there seems to be a problem. The way
out of this, proposed by Piron and Jauch, is to interpret p ∧ p′ operationally as
“Randomly choose to perform an experiment for either p or p′.”. By executing this
procedure many times on almost identical states we can hope to verify or falsify
this conjunction. We interpret the disjunction in a similar way. [2]
Finally, one might wonder if we can again reconstruct A from Π(A). Put bluntly,
does this logic contain all the interesting information about our physics? The an-
swer is yes39, if we start out with A as a Von Neumann subalgebra of B(H) for
some Hilbert space H and we remember the embedding Π(A) ⊂ B(H). Then, a
non-trivial result from functional analysis tells us that A is isomorphic to the dou-
ble commutant of Π(H). [42] However, without this extra information, it is not
immediately clear how one would reconstruct A. In that sense, the result is a bit
unsatisfactory when one compares it to its classical analogue.
Summarising, we have found that quantum logic differs from the classical logic
(that we can derive from classical mechanics) in the following respects.
37To an arbitrary precision, in theory.
38I am talking about the case that of two propositions that involve non-commuting observables.
Unless we are in a common eigenstate by coincidence, these observables are not comeasurable.
39This is also true in another sense. If we know the truth value of all propositions, we know the
support of our state. This means that it uniquely determines our state if and only if it is pure,
exactly like in classical kinematics.
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1. ∨ and ∧ do not distribute over each other.
2. Therefore, there exists no Heyting implication.
3. The interpretation of (−)⊥ is not what we are used to: for a state |ψ〉, truth
of p⊥ should be interpreted as “p is false”, rather than as “p is not true”.
4. Pure states do not determine the truth of all quantum propositions. Because
the notion of truth is too crude, they do not determine an interesting40 map
from our quantum lattice to some set of truth values (rather than probabili-
ties). Jargon: there is no satisfactory state-proposition pairing.
5. To say more, there cannot be such a map to a Boolean algebra of truth values
if we require it to preserve the logical structure on the Boolean sublogics.
6. The interpretation of ∨ is not what we are used to: for a state |ψ〉, p∨ p′ can
be true, while neither p nor p′ is true. In particular, the law of the excluded
middle holds.
7. The operational interpretation of various propositions is a bit subtle.
8. It is not obvious how one can reconstruct the algebra of observables from this
quantum logic.
Of course, this does not say that quantum logic is not correct! One has to be careful
though, when interpreting quantum propositions.
4 Topos Quantum Kinematics (Semantics)
4.1 A Topos for Quantum Kinematics
4.1.1 Bohr’s Doctrine of Classical Contexts
We hope that this discussion of conventional quantum logic has convinced the reader
that a new notion of quantum kinematics that is closer to our classical intuition
might lead to new insights. Why would one expect that topos theory could be of
any use here? Probably, judging by the introductions given in [10],[20] and [29] the
primary motivation can be found in the need for a suitable object of truth values for
the quantum logic. The sentiment seems to be that the all or nothing distinction
that is made is Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum logic does not do justice to the
subtleties of quantum probabilities. The hope is of course, that this can be realised
as the subobject classifier of a suitable topos.
As I will argue, in pursuit of this goal, the topos approaches to quantum kine-
matics build a framework in a topos that presents the interplay between observables,
states and propositions in a way that stays very close to what we know from classical
mechanics. Put bluntly, the distinction between classical and quantum kinematics
is reduced to the choice of a topos. Therefore, the next question to address is: “If
quantum mechanics does not take place in Set, which topos should we choose?”.
The papers of both Butterfield and Isham and those of the Landsman et al. mo-
tivate this choice from a vague philosophy known as Bohr’s doctrine of classical
contexts. Bohr once phrased this as follows. [6]
40Of course, one can choose to call the propositions ‘true’ that are true with probability 1, while
one says the rest is ‘false’.
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However far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical
explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical
terms. (...) The argument is simply that by the word experiment we
refer to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what
we have learned and that, therefore, the account of the experimental
arrangements and of the results of the observations must be expressed
in unambiguous language with suitable application of the terminology
of classical physics.
We obtain information about a quantum system by investigating it in various clas-
sical contexts. In the mathematical formalism, these classical contexts are repre-
sented by commutative subalgebras of our algebra of observables. The idea that
these classical contexts should contain a lot of information about a quantum system
(at least in the case dimH > 2!) is made rigourous by the following much more
recent results41.
Apparently, assigning a value to all observables in such a way that it is consistent
in each classical context is already too much to ask for:
Theorem 4.1 (Kochen-Specker (Observable version),[16], Theorem 2.4). Suppose
A is a Von Neumann algebra with no type I1 and I2 summands. Then, there does
not exist a map A −→ C that restricts to a *-homomorphism on each commutative
Von Neumann subalgebra.
Similarly, as a corollary of the solution to the Mackey-Gleason problem (theorem
3.11), we see that a state is immediately determined if we know it in all classical
contexts.
Definition 3 (Quasi-State). Let A be a Von Neumann algebra. Then we un-
derstand a quasi-state on A to be a map A ω−→ C with the properties that
its restriction to each commutative Von Neumann subalgebra is a state and that
ω(a+ ia′) = ω(a) + iω(a′) for all self-adjoint a, a′ ∈ A.
Theorem 4.2 (Gleason,[8]). Let A be a Von Neumann algebra without type I2
summand. Then any quasi-state on A is actually a state.
Finally, we have a similar phenomenon on the logical level:
Theorem 4.3 (Kochen-Specker (Logical version42), easy corollary of results in
[16]). Suppose A is a Von Neumann algebra with no type I1 and I2 summands.
Then, there does not exist a map Π(A) −→ L into a non-trivial distributive lattice
L that is a lattice homomorphism when restricted to each Boolean subalgebra of
Π(B(H)).
Proof. Suppose we do have such a map Π(A) q−→ L. Then, we have a lattice
homomorphism L
ay−→ Spec(L) that embeds the lattice (as the principal ideals) in its
frame of ideals. Seeing that this is a frame, it has a natural structure of a (complete)
Heyting algebra. This means that we have a homomorphism of Heyting algebras
Spec(L)
¬¬−→ Compl(Spec(L)) =: B to its Boolean subalgebra B of complemented
elements. Then, pick a point p of B (a homomorphism to {⊥,>}). (We can do this
since non-triviality of L implies that B is non-trivial and every non-trivial Boolean
41One should note that the Kochen-Specker theorem actually emphasises a fundamental dif-
ference between the classical and the quantum world. Paradoxically enough, it will serve as an
important motivation for the topos approach to quantum kinematics that tries to stress analogies
with classical kinematics.
42To make this sound more like a statement about logic, the usual, weaker statement of this
theorem is that there does not exist a Π(A) −→ B into a non-trivial Boolean algebra B that is a
morphism of Boolean algebras when restricted to each Boolean subalgebra of Π(B(H)).
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algebra has points (the points of its Stone space). Then, p ◦ ¬¬ ◦ ay ◦ q defines a
two-valued finitely additive probability measure on Π(A). According to Lemma 2.7
in [16] this extends to a *-homomorphism A −→ C , which we know not to exist by
theorem 4.1.
The motivating idea for topos quantum kinematics will therefore be that we
only investigate quantum systems by probing them in these classical contexts. Re-
call that Set is the topos we use to describe classical mechanics. The idea rises that
the ‘quantum topos’ might therefore be related to Set. Its objects should represent
‘things that we can probe by classical contexts to obtain something in Set’. Phras-
ing the doctrine of classical contexts this suggestive way strongly suggests that our
topos should be a topos of certain presheaves43 over some category of classical con-
texts.
We have reached the point where the two approaches to topos quantum theory
part ways. Butterfield, Isham and Doering model a quantum system by a (non-
commutative) Von Neumann algebra A and consider the category of presheaves
over the poset V(A) of commutative Von Neumann subalgebras (ordered by inclu-
sion) as their quantum topos44. Heunen, Landsman, Spitters et al. in contrast
start out with a general C*-algebra A and construct their quantum topos as the
category of presheaves over C(A)op, where C(A) denotes the poset of commutative
C*-subalgebras of A45.
4.1.2 Which subalgebras?
We should immediately ask how much information we lose by passing from the non-
commutative algebra of observables to the poset of its commutative subalgebras. In
the case of Von Neumann algebras a partial answer has been given by Doering:
Theorem 4.4 ([19]). Suppose A,A′ are Von-Neumann algebras without type I2
summands46. Then, for each order-isomorphism V(A) f−→ V(A′) there exists a
unique Jordan *-isomorphism47 A g−→ A′ such that for all A ∈ V(A) f(A) = g(A).
One might expect that we do not preserve the commutator and with that, by
Heisenberg’s equation, the dynamics. Fortunately, we do not lose more than that48!
We can therefore hope to formulate a good theory of quantum kinematic in this
topos framework.
If we start out with a general C*-algebra A, however, one might suspect that
the Von Neumann subalgebras do not contain enough information. This can be
seen from the following result of Heunen. Indeed, an arbitrary C*-algebra need not
even have any projections.
43Indeed, one common way of interpreting the Yoneda lemma is as the statement that presheaves
over a category C are entities modeled on C, entities that we can get to know by probing them by
objects of C.
44It should be noted that these authors have introduced many different approaches in their fairly
broad programme of topos theoretic descriptions of physics. We shall, however, restrict to their
account of quantum mechanics that connects best with that of Heunen, Landsman and Spitters.
45The reader might object that in this way the topos we use for quantum theory depends on
the algebra A and therefore on the particular system we are considering. On the other hand Set is
used for all classical mechanical systems. This is indeed a strange distinction. However, one might
say that ‘the quantum topos’ should be the one where we take A to be the algebra of observables
corresponding to all measurable quantities in the universe.
46i.e summands of the form B(C 2).
47A ∗-algebra homomorphism that need only preserve the symmetric product, rather than the
whole product.
48Of course, this theorem does not say that we indeed lose the commutator. In fact, we do
remember if two elements commute or not. It is not obvious, however, how one should reconstruct
the precise value of the commutator if elements do not commute.
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Theorem 4.5 (Practically49, theorem 4 in [27]). Let A be a C*-algebra. Then
V(A), together with the inclusion functions rather than just the order relation50, and
Π(A) contain the same information. That is, on the one hand the Boolean algebras
of projections corresponding to elements of V(A) unite into one non-distributive
lattice, using Kalmbach’s Bundle lemma:
Π(A) ∼= lim−→
A∈V(A)
Π(A), (in Pos)
and on the other hand, we can retrieve each commutative Von Neumann subalgebra
of A (up to isomorphism) as the continuous functions on the Stone spectrum of a
Boolean subalgebra of Π(A).
Apart from showing us that we can recover the Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum
logic from our new topos framework of quantum logic, we also see that it is natural
to consider the poset of all C*-subalgebras in case we are dealing with an arbitrary
C*-algebra, since the Von Neumann subalgebras simply do not contain enough
information. A recent result by Nuiten leads us to believe that the C*-subalgebras
actually contain a serious amount of information about the C*-algebra we started
out with. To state this result, we first note that our definition of C on objects
extends to a functor
CStar
C - Pos
A C(A)
-
A′
h
?
C(A′),
C(h)
?
where C(h) takes the direct image of subalgebras under h. This is again a C*-
algebra by theorem 4.1.9 in [33]. Let us adopt the convention that 0 is not called
a C*-algebra. Then we have the following. (This convention will also help avoid
difficulties caused by the fact that 0 has an empty Gelfand spectrum.)
Theorem 4.6 ([37]). The functor CStar
C−→ Pos is faithful and reflects all isomor-
phisms.
This shows that the poset of commutative C*-subalgebras should contain enough
information to set up a formalism of physics, even if we are dealing with an arbitrary
C*-algebra. These three theorems validate the choices of sites51 for the quantum
toposes made by the two different approaches to quantum kinematics.
In this paper, we shall be assuming that our quantum observables form a Von
Neumann algebra, perhaps by constructing a universal enveloping Von Neumann
algebra, if the reader would like to think of it that way. Therefore, it will suffice to
work with the poset of commutative Von Neumann subalgebras in our description
of the contravariant approach as well as in that of the covariant approach. This will
enable us to associate an interesting logic to the physics.
49Heunen proves this for a Von Neumann algebra A. However, the same proof holds for a general
C*-algebra.
50This can also be described as the pair (V(A),A), where A is the tautological commutative
C*-algebra object in SetV(A) (see description of covariant approach).
51Of course, one can still argue about Grothendieck topologies.
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4.2 The Contravariant Approach
As we will see, the more recent covariant approach to topos quantum theory be-
gins by defining an internal commutative C*-algebra in its ‘quantum topos’, starting
from the data of the original non-commutative C*-algebra in Set, and then proceeds
along the lines of section 3, setting up the whole framework (of observables, states
and propositions) for kinematics both in terms of algebra and geometry, using inter-
nal versions of the duality theorems of this section. By contrast, the contravariant
approach was less theory driven and more ad hoc, skipping the stepping stone of
algebra and immediately proceeding to the construction of a geometry in the topos.
In this section, we will discuss the basic definitions of this formalism.
Recall that, in this approach, we assume that we start out with a Von Neumann
algebra A of quantum observables. All of our quantum mechanics will be taking
place in the topos SetV(A)
op
.
In the contravariant approach, it is proposed to replace the Hilbert space by the
so-called spectral presheaf, as the fundamental object representing the geometry of
a quantum system. To define it, we should note the following:
Theorem 4.7 (Maximal ideal in a commutative C*-algebra, [41]). There is a
one to one correspondence between maximal ideals in a C*-algebra A and ring *-
homomorphisms A −→ C .
Proof (sketch). Obviously, every such *-morphisms has a maximal ideal as its ker-
nel. The converse fact that every maximal ideal comes from a morphism to C is a
direct consequence of the Gelfand-Mazur theorem.
Definition 4 (Spectral presheaf). The spectral presheaf52 Σ ∈ SetV(A)op is defined
as
1. On objects A ∈ V(A), Σ(A) := Max(A) is the Gelfand spectrum of A.
2. On morphisms A ⊂ A′, Σ(A ⊂ A′) := (λ 7→ λ|A).
The idea is that this object represents the geometries associated to all the classi-
cal contexts bundled together. [21] continuous to associate a kind of logical structure
to this ‘geometry’. The intuition it behind the construction seems to be that the
spectral presheaf is a presheaf of Stone spaces53 and therefore its subpresheaves of
clopen subsets should represent some sort of logic. This leads to the definition of
an internal frame54 PclΣ ⊂ PΣ, such that
SubclΣ := Γ(PclΣ)55 ⊂ Sub(Σ)
consists precisely of the subpresheaves P of Σ such that P (A) is clopen in Σ(A) for
all A ∈ V(A).
In a recent paper by Wolters, [43], another internal frame56OΣ∗ ⊂ PΣ was intro-
duced trying to make the role of the spectral presheaf as representing the quantum
geometry in the topos more explicit. One should think of it as a realisation of the
spectral presheaf as an internal locale. Although it might not have been entirely
clear from [43], these two subframes of PΣ are closely related. The constructions
52I will adhere to the convention of underlining objects of presheaf categories, that is common
in the literature on topos quantum logic.
53The Gelfand spectrum of a commutative Von Neumann algebra is even hyperstonean. [42]
54It might be better to speak about a complete Heyting algebra here rather than a frame,
because the interpretation will be mainly a logical one.
55Here Γ denotes the global sections functor.
56The * is used in the notation since we want to distinguish the corresponding internal locale
Σ∗ from the spectral presheaf Σ.
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boil down to the following.
Note that yA × Σ ⊂ Σ and therefore
PΣ(A) = Hom(yA × Σ,Ω)
∼= Sub(yA × Σ)
⊂ Sub(Σ).
We define a pair of subfunctors
Definition 5 (PclΣ ⊂ OΣ∗ ⊂ PΣ). We define
PclΣ(A) :=
{
P ⊂ yA × Σ | for all A′ ∈ V(A): P (A′) is clopen (as a subset of Σ(A′))
}
and
OΣ∗(A) := {P ⊂ yA × Σ | for all A′ ∈ V(A): P (A′) is open (as a subset of Σ(A′))} .
Since OΣ∗ will play a very important role in later constructions, it is worthwhile
lingering for a bit on its definition. To make this more explicit, we define the
following bundle of topological spaces.
Definition 6 ((Contravariant) spectral bundle). Let Σ∗ be the topological space
with underlying set {(A, λ)|A ∈ V(A), λ ∈ Σ(A) } and opens U ⊂ Σ∗ such that,
when we write UA := U ∩ Σ(A),
1. ∀A ∈ V(A) : UA ∈ OΣ(A);
2. If λ ∈ UA and A′ ⊂ A, then λ|A′ ∈ UA′ .
Let us endow V(A) with the anti-Alexandroff topology (consisting of the lower sets).
Then it is straightforwardly verified that the projection map
Σ∗ pi−→ V(A)
is continuous. We shall call this map the spectral bundle.
Theorem 4.8 ([43]). OΣ∗ is an internal frame in SetV(A)op . We shall write Σ∗
for it, if we want to think of it as an internal locale.
Proof. It is almost tautological that
OΣ∗(A) = O(pi−1(↓ A)) = O(Σ∗|↓A). (∗)
Now, we recall that by the comparison lemma (see e.g. [31] C2.2.3) we have an
equivalence of categories between the presheaves over a poset and the sheaves over
that poset endowed with the anti-Alexandroff topology. In particular,
SetV(A)
op ∼=- Sh(V(A))
P - P 57, P (↓ A) = P (A)
which restricts to an equivalence of categories between the categories of internal
locales. Moreover, by theorem C1.6.3 in [31], we have an equivalence of categories
Loc(Sh(X))
∼= - Loc/X
L - (L(X) −→ X),
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where the total space of the bundle of locales corresponding to an internal locale L
is L(X). We apply this with X = V(A). We had already found (∗) that
Σ∗(V(A)) = lim−→
A∈V(A)
Σ∗(↓ A) = lim−→
A∈V(A)
Σ∗(A) = Σ∗ pi−→ V(A)
was a bundle of locales (in Set). This makes Σ∗ and therefore Σ∗ into an internal
locale.
Similarly, PclΣ is a complete Heyting algebra. (We think of it this way rather
than a locale.)
Theorem 4.9. PclΣ is an internal complete Heyting algebra.
Proof. Note that, by spectral theory, the lattice of clopen subsets of Σ(A) is iso-
morphic to the frame of projectors. (See also theorem 4.13.) Since A is a Von
Neumann algebra, the frame of projectors is complete. Consequently, Pcl(Σ(A)) is
a frame. The argument of theorem 4.8 show that PclΣ is an internal frame. Finally,
we invoke lemma 1 to conclude that it is an internal Heyting algebra.
One can wonder if the internal locale Σ∗ can be constructed from an internal
commutative C*-algebra, like in the covariant approach. The answer turns out to
be negative in all interesting cases, as was proved by Wolters.
Theorem 4.10 ([43]). The internal locale Σ∗ is compact. However, if A is such
that V(A) 6= {C · 1}, then it fails to be regular. In particular, it is not the internal
Gelfand spectrum of some internal commutative C*-algebra.
We will see that the spectral presheaf and this internal locale associated to it are
the fundamental objects representing the geometry in the contravariant approach.
That is, we will define the propositions, observables and states in terms of them.
In particular, we will later see that, using a process called daseinisation, we can
construct an embedding of sup-lattices
Π(A) ⊂ - Γ(PclΣ) = Subcl(Σ)⊂Γ(OΣ∗) = Subopen(Σ).
Note that (in general) the meet cannot be preserved as well, since Π(A) is not
distributive as a lattice, while Subcl(Σ) is. We gain distributivity at the cost of the
rule of the excluded middle.
Moreover, it turns out that the construction of daseinisation naturally extends
to self-adjoint elements of A. Using this construction, observables take the form of
arrows Σ −→ R, where R is a kind of real numbers object in SetV(A)op . We will
have an embedding Asa ↪−→ Hom(Σ, R).
Finally, one can also express quantum states in terms of the spectral presheaf.
Given this geometry, one might try to mimic classical mechanics or Hilbert space
quantum mechanics, where the pure states are represented by points of the geom-
etry, and hope that the points of this internal locale give a good notion of state
of our quantum system. It turns out, as was first noted by Butterfield and Isham,
that this analogy cannot possibly hold. Indeed, they proved the following.
Theorem 4.11 (Contravariant internal Kochen-Specker,[11, 16]). Suppose A is a
Von Neumann algebra with no type I1 and I2 summands. Then, the spectral presheaf
Σ does not have any global sections.
Proof. This is just a reformulation of theorem 4.1. One only has to note the corre-
spondence between maximal ideals in a commutative C*-algebra a *-homomorphisms
to C .
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Remark 4.12. In [43], it is claimed that, as a consequence of this, the internal
locale Σ∗ has no points58. However, I have trouble following the arguments that are
given. For instance, it seems to be implicitly assumed that Σ∗ and V(A) are sober.
Indeed, Wolters assumes that the internal locale would have a point and tries to
derive a contradiction, by stating (after definition 2.1) that this would imply that
the bundle of topological spaces Σ∗ −→ V(A) has a section. At the same time he
goes through a lot a trouble to obtain a partial result of sobriety of Σ∗ later on in
the paper (Lemma 2.26). Moreover, it is not hard to see that V(A) is sober if and
only if it is well-founded as a poset (every non-empty subset has a minimal element),
which is certainly not true for all infinite dimensional A. (As an easy consequence,
Σ∗ also is sober iff V(A) is well-founded.) If this were the only problem, the proof
would at least still hold for finite dimensional A. However, there seems to be a
crucial mistake in the point set topology that follows (top of page 14). (This seems
to be a consequence of an attempt to mimic the proof of the corresponding theorem
in the covariant approach, where the topology of the spectral bundle is defined
‘in reverse’, because one replaces V(A) by V(A)op.) I have not yet had the time
to find an alternative proof or counter example (as these are necessarily rather
complicated).
The construction of states in the contravariant approach unfortunately is a
bit more intricate, but still resembles the situation of classical kinematics quite
closely if one takes the right point of view: states are represented by certain maps
Subcl(Σ) −→ HomPos(V(A)op, [0, 1])59. Note that in this quantum logic, therefore,
states indeed pair with propositions (elements of Subcl(Σ)) to yield truth values in
HomPos(V(A)op, [0, 1]), which in their turn give rise to maps 1 −→ Ω, truth values
in a topos theoretic sense.
4.2.1 Propositions
Our goal in this section is to construct an injection Π(A) δ↪−→ Subcl(Σ). As we
investigate A by performing experiments in all the classical contexts A ∈ V(A), the
intuition is that Σ should represent the idea of the ‘Gelfand spectrum of A’. (We
take the spectrum in each context.) Recall that for a commutative Von Neumann
algebr the Gelfand spectrum coincides with the Stone spectrum of the Boolean al-
gebra of its self-adjoint idempotents. Therefore, one hopes that it can act as a sort
of Stone space for quantum logic.
Let us proceed with the construction. First, note that for p ∈ A ∈ V(A), treating
A as an algebra of classical observables, it is reasonable from the point of view of
our philosophy to set
δ(p)(A) := {λ ∈ Σ(A) |λ(p) = 1 }.
What should δ(p)(A) be for A that do not contain p however? According to our
philosophy, we should construct δ(p)(A) out of the data that someone in classical
context A has available about p. We should somehow try to approximate the
information captured by p as good as we can by information that is accesible to us
from our classical point of view A. The key idea will be that we approximate p by
some projection in A. There are two natural ways of doing this, either we take
δo(p)A :=
∧
{q ∈ Π(A) | q ≥ p },
58That is internal locale morphisms from the terminal internal locale Ω. Using the equivalence
Loc(Sh(X)) ∼= Loc/X, one could equivalently say that Σ∗ −→ V(A) has no global sections in the
sense of maps of locales.
59Originally [21] proposed two different notions of a state. As it turns out, however, both are
special cases of the definition of a state we shall be using, which is due to [43].
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the approximation from above or we approximate from below:
δi(p)A :=
∨
{q ∈ Π(A) | q ≤ p }.
We would then like to set
δ(p)(A) := {λ ∈ Σ(A) |λ(δ(p)A) = 1 }.
(Note that this agrees with our previous definition.) This should define a subfunctor
of Σ. In the case we take δ = δo it indeed does, while this fails for δ = δi. This
motivates our choice for δ := δo60. These maps δo and δo are both referred to as
outer daseinisation.
A physical interpretation of these approximation procedures is the following.
The outer daseinisation of a Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum proposition represents
in some sense its strongest consequence in our classical context, while the inner
daseinisation would stand for the weakest antecedent in our classical context that
would imply it.
We now have the following. (The proof is not too illuminating.)
Theorem 4.13 ([17]).
Π(A) ⊂ δ
o
- Subcl(Σ)
p - {λ ∈ Σ(A) |λ(δo(p)A) = 1 }
defines an embedding61 of complete distributive sup-lattices (preserving ≤, 0, 1,∨).
Note that it does not also preserve ∧ in general, since it is a map from a non-
distributive lattice to a distributive one. However, Subcl(Σ) does have small meets
and
δo(p ∧ q) ≤ δo(p) ∧ δo(q).
Moreover, δo does not preserve the negation and Subcl(Σ) does in general not satisfy
the law of the excluded middle.
Finally, for each A ∈ V(A), it restricts to an order isomorphism
Π(A)
∼=
δo(A)
- Subcl(Σ(A)).
Summarising, we have embedded the Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum logic into
a complete Heyting algebra, sacrificing our meet, negation and with that the law of
the excluded middle to gain distributivity.
4.2.2 Observables
As we will see quantum observables inject into Hom(Σ,R↔), where R↔ is some sort
of object in SetV(A)
op
related to the real numbers. One might expect that quantum
propositions, like classical propositions, then arise as the pullback of certain sub-
objects ∆ ⊂ R↔ along observables Σ δ(a)−→ R↔. This is indeed the approach that is
argued one should take in [22] and [23]. As far as I know, however, this approach
has never been fully worked out.
60As the whole situation is mirrored, we will be using the inner daseinisation in the covariant
approach.
61Note that an injective (finite) sup-preserving morphisms is automatically an order embedding.
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Instead, the contravariant approach uses the ordinary Birkhoff-Von Neumann
quantum propositions62, but embedded in Subcl(Σ), as in theorem 4.13. The reali-
sation as observables as maps Σ −→ R↔) therefore mostly serves to emphasise the
role of Σ a quantum analogue of the classical phase space. A second reason for us
to present it here is because it originally inspired the covariant approach, where one
does construct quantum propositions like one does in classical mechanics, as inverse
images.
The first thing that has to be done is extend the definition of the outer and in-
ner daseinisation from projections to all observables. This is done by extending the
order on Π(A) to the so-called spectral order ≤s on Asa. Let a, a′ ∈ Asa and let
(eλ ∈ Π(A))λ∈R and (e′λ ∈ Π(A))λ∈R be their respective resolutions. Then we say
that a ≤s a′ if and only if eλ ≤ e′λ for all λ ∈ R. This order turns the self-adjoint
elements into a conditionally complete lattice63. [38] Note that this is not the usual
order on Asa. Then, for a ∈ Asa and A ∈ V(A), we define the definitions of outer
and inner daseinisations,
δo(a)A :=
∧
{a′ ∈ Asa | a′ ≥s a } and
δi(a)A :=
∨
{a′ ∈ Asa | a′ ≤s a }.
Effectively, what we are doing is replacing the projections in the spectral resolution
of a by their daseinisation as a projection.
Then, R↔ is defined as the subpresheaf64 of HomPos(↓ −,R) × HomPos((↓
−)op,R) where R↔ consists of the (µ, ν) such that pointwise µ ≤ ν. The the
contravariant daseinisation of observables is defined to be the map
Asa ⊂ δ˘ - Hom(Σ,R↔)
a -
(
Σ
δ˘(a)
- R↔
)
λ - (λ(δi(a)A), λ(δo(a)A)).
It is not difficult to see that this is injective. See for instance [23].
Trying to mirror classical kinematics, one might hope that δ˘(a) would be a
continuous map or a measurable map in some sense. Then, one would have a
reasonable way of constructing propositions as inverse images of open or measurable
subobjects of R↔. Indeed, in the covariant approach, one can indeed show that a
similar construction helps realise observables as continuous maps or internal locales.
In [43], Wolters showns that if one replaces Σ by the internal locale Σ∗ and if one
chooses the most obvious frame of opens for R↔, then the map defined above is not
continuous.
4.2.3 States
In their original papers Isham and Doering use two notions of a state which they
call ‘pseudo-states’ and ‘truth objects’. The definition of state we will use here, first
introduced in [18], is a more general one that incorporates both of these notions.
62Recall that these in turn were constructed from an observable a ∈ Asa and a Borel subset
∆ ⊂ R
63i.e. every set of elements bounded that has an upper bound also has a join and every set of
elements that has a lower bound has a meet.
64HomPos(↓ (A ≤ A′),R) = HomPos(↓ A′,R) −→ HomPos(↓ A,R), µ 7→ µ|↓A and similarly for
HomPos((↓ −)op,R).
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It has the added advantage that it can also deal with mixed states and that it
resembles the convention in the covariant approach more closely.
Definition 7 (Measure on an internal lattice L). We call a map L
µ−→ [0, 1]l65 a
(finitely additive) measure if
1. µ(>) = 1;
2. µ(x) + µ(y) = µ(x ∧ y) + µ(x ∨ y).
Definition 8 (Contravariant state). States in the contravariant approach are rep-
resented by internal measures on the spectral presheaf, natural transformations
PclΣ
µ−→ [0, 1]l.
They are uniquely determined by µ = Γµ. Then they are characterised as functions
Γ(PclΣ) = Subcl(Σ) µ−→ HomPos(V(A)op, [0, 1]) = Γ([0, 1]l)66
s.t. for every A ∈ V(A) and for every S1, S2 ∈ Subcl(Σ)
1. µ(Σ)(A) = 1;
2. µ(S1)(A) + µ(S2)(A) = µ(S1 ∧ S2)(A) + µ(S1 ∨ S2)(A);
3. µ(S)(A) only depends on SA.
The first thing we should check is that this definition of a state indeed has some
relation with the conventional notion of a quantum state. We have the following.
Theorem 4.14 ([18]). It is easy to check that a quasi-state A ω−→ C defines a
measure µω on the spectral presheaf by
µω(S)(A) := ω
(
δo(A)−1(S(A))
)
,
where δo(A) is the isomorphism Π(A) −→ Subcl(Σ(A)) of theorem 4.13. Less triv-
ially, it can be proved that this defines a bijection between quasi-states on A and
measures on PclΣ.
Therefore, by theorem 4.2, if A has no summands of type I2, the injection of
states into measures on the spectral presheaf is also surjective.
Of course, seeing the motivation of our topos framework by theorems 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3, we could never really hope that it would work out for A with type I2
summands. This result therefore basically tells us that measures on the spectral
presheaf are precisely the right notion of state in the contravariant approach.
Again, the reader should note that this notion of state is the general notion of a
positive normalised functional on A. One can also characterise the states used by
physicists, those that come from trace class operators, in this framework. These are
precisely those measures that are in some sense σ-additive, instead of just finitely
additive. The details can be found in [18].
65Here [0, 1]l denotes the unit interval in the lower reals (in the topos).
66Explicitly [0, 1]l(A) = HomPos(V(A)op, [0, 1]).
28
4.2.4 State-Proposition Pairing
Recall that one of the issues with Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum logic was that
it did not have a satisfactory state-proposition pairing. According to theorem 4.3
quantum logic did not have any non-trivial Boolean-valued models, not even of the
weaker kind where we demand that the logical structure was respected only on
Boolean subalgebras of the quantum logic. In theorem 4.13 we already found that
the contravariant topos quantum logic provided some consolation: outer daseinisa-
tion defines a Heyting-valued model of this weaker kind.
However, this is not exactly what we would hope for yet. In classical mechanics,
each pure state defines a homomorphism from the associated logic to the two-value
Boolean algebra. One might hope that pure states also define homomorphisms from
to some Heyting algebra of subterminals in this topos framework. This turns out
to be too much to hope for. Although we do have a natural map from Π(A) to this
Heyting algebra, it is not a homomorphism, not even for pure states. This yet again
indicates a non-deterministic nature of quantum mechanics. In this respect both
pure and mixed quantum states behave like mixed states in classical mechanics.
The situation is as follows.
We note that a quantum state ω represented by a measure µω on the spectral
presheaf determines a map
Π(A) ⊂ δ
o
- Subcl(Σ)
µω - HomPos(V(A)op, [0, 1])
[a∆] - δo([a∆]) -
(
A 7→ µω(δo([a∆])(A)) = ω(δo([a∆])A)
)
.
According to the Born interpretation, we thus assign the set of probabilities of that
the approximation of [a∆] in each classical context is true. If we do not want
to deal with probabilities but one might now apply the map that forgets all the
probabilistic information and sends every non-1-probability to 0. This defines a
map67
HomPos(V(A)op, [0, 1]) = Γ([0, 1]
l
)
ΓDich- ΓΩ ∼= Sub1 ∼= {S ⊂ V(A) |S is a downset }
ν - {A ∈ V(A) | ν(A) = 1 }.
We conclude that we have found a map68
Π(A) truthω- ΓΩ = Sub(1)
p - ΓDich(µω(δ
o(p))).
67Again, this comes from a map
[0, 1]
l
Dich - Ω
HomPos(V(A)op, [0, 1]) = [0, 1]l(A)
DichA - Ω(A) = P(↓ A)
ν - {A′ ∈↓ A | ν(A′) = 1 }.
.
68The reader might have been expecting this to be defined as a map SubclΣ −→ Sub1, hoping
that this would be a lattice (or even Heyting) homomorphism for pure states ω. (The pure states
define homomorphisms to the truth values in classical kinematics.) Unfortunately, this does not
work out. As one can check, this map indeed preserves ∧, but not ∨. This follows since, if it
would, we would have found a lattice homomorphism from Π(A) to {⊥,>}, which we know not
to exist by theorem 4.3. (Indeed, δo preserves ∨.)
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4.2.5 Interpretation of Truth
Two questions that spring to mind are:
1. How much information can we infer about ω from knowing truthω?
2. How should we interpret these truth values?
It is not difficult to see that truthω contains the same information as the support
of ω (all the possible senses are equivalent: either as linear functional on A, or as
measure, or as operator on H). Therefore, in this respect these ‘nuanced’ truth
values are no better than those of the Birkhoff-Von Neumann logic. (Recall that
there, a state defined a truth value Π(A) truthω−→ {0, 1}, p 7→ Dich(ω(p)).) The
difference is therefore to be sought in the truth value of one particular proposition.
By definition69 truthω(p)(A) = 1 iff ω(δ
o(p)A) = 1, i.e. if with certainty the
proposition δo(p)A is true for ω (in the Birkhoff-Von Neumann sense). Seeing that
δo(p)A is the strongest logical consequence of p that we can measure in our classical
context A, we can immediately say that p is true for ω if and only if truthω(p)(A) = 1
for all A. The way one should therefore think of these propositions is with the
intension of falsification in mind.
Indeed, truth of δo(p)A guarantees nothing about the truth of p. However,
assume proposition p is not true for state ω and we want to exhibit this with the
restriction that we are only allowed to perform measurements in classical context
A (because we want to avoid disturbing our system to much, say). Then, our best
option is to examine δo(p)A. If that turns out to be not true, neither was p. The
way to interpret truthω(p), therefore, is that it has a value 0 at context A if and only
if we can falsify p by measuring observables from A. Since the logical operations on
the subobject lattice are computed pointwise, so truth of δo(p)∧ δo(p′) at A should
be interpreted as possibility of falsifying p and q by measuring observables from A
and similarly for ∨. In particular, note that there is no ambiguity as to which of
the two experiments should be performed first, since the propositions commute.
4.2.6 Summary
Summarising, we have set up a framework for quantum kinematics in the topos
SetV(A)
op
. This was built on the definition of the spectral presheaf Σ, or the corre-
sponding internal locale Σ∗. In terms of this ‘geometry’70, we defined generalised
sets of observables, states and propositions, in which the corresponding objects of
ordinary quantum mechanics were embedded. This went as follows.
Observables:
Asa ⊂ δ˘- Hom(Σ,R↔),
(also, recall that this failed to be a map into C(Σ∗, IR)), states:
S (A) ⊂ - Squasi(A) ∼=“finitely additive measures”(PclΣ),
propositions:
Π(A) ⊂ δ
o
- SubclΣ ⊂- ΓOΣ∗ ∼= OΣ∗
69We will occasionality denote the values this maps takes at each context respectively by 0 and
1, rather than by ∅ and {∗}.
70Also, recall that there was no corresponding algebra in the topos, as Σ∗ failed to be regular
and could therefore not be interpreted as the spectrum of an internal C*-algebra.
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. This last map defines a sup-embedding of orders and it restricts to an order-
isomorphism between each Π(A) and Subcl(Σ(A)), A ∈ V(A). This enlarged ‘quan-
tum logic’ has the following properties.
1. It is a complete Heyting algebra.
2. The interpretation of the (Heyting) negation is “p is not true”, rather than
“p is false”.
3. Each state determines the truth-value of all quantum propositions. This is a
consequence of our dichotomy-map that transformed probabilities into true-
false71-judgements in each classical context. The truth values at different
classical contexts have the immediate operational interpretation as possibility
of falsification: a 0 means that falsification is possible.
4. The pure (and mixed) states do not determine lattice homomorphisms SubclΣ −→
Sub1.
5. We have a sup-embedding of Π(A) into the complete Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ),
that, when restricted to any Boolean subalgebra of Π(A), defines an isomor-
phism of Boolean algebras to Subcl(Max(A))
72.
6. The interpretation of ∨ is what we are used to: for a state |ψ〉, p∨ p′ can only
be true, if either p or p′ is true. However, the law of the excluded middle fails.
7. The propositions have a clear operational interpetation. The logical opera-
tions are defined pointwise so we are only combining commuting propositions
in conjunctions and disjunctions. The truth value of such combined propo-
sitions therefore does not depend on the order in which we verify the truth
value of the building blocks of this proposition.
8. It is not obvious how one can reconstruct the algebra of observables from this
quantum logic.
By using outer daseinisation we can form a truth value for each classical context. A
proposition if precisely not true in a context for a certain state, if it can be falsified
by performing measurements from that context.
4.3 The Covariant Approach
Conventionally, the covariant approach to topos quantum logic starts out with a
general C*-algebra A. As discussed in section 4.1.2 it not enough in this case to
consider only its commutative Von Neumann subalgebras. Instead, one should take
into account the poset C(A) of all commutative C*-subalgebras. However, recently,
in particular in [28], the covariant approach too has started to consider more specific
kinds of C*-algebras73. The reason to do this is that, although one can formulate
a nice theory of observables and states when dealing with an arbitrary C*-algebra,
the logical side of the story is not very nice. This is a consequence of the lack of
projections that a C*-algebra might have.
With the ideas in mind that one can embed any C*-algebra in its universal
enveloping Von Neumann algebra and that these are in fact the only algebras of
operators mathematical physicists seem to use in practice, I have made the choice to
restrict to the case of Von Neumann algebras, also in my description of the covariant
71Maybe, ‘not true’ might better describe the situation here than ‘false’.
72Note that this does not contradict theorem 4.3.
73In particular, from general to specific, it considered spectral, Rickart, AW* and Von Neumann
algebras.
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approach. This will also make a comparison with the contravariant approach more
easy. The reader should bear in mind, however, that most of the results hold in
greater generality.
In this approach we will therefore start out with a Von Neumann algebra A
and set up a formalism of quantum kinematics in SetV(A). This time, however,
we take a more theory driven approach. We have a naturally have an internal
commutative C*-algebra in SetV(A). We mirror the constructions we performed in
classical kinematics to obtain from this both a fully algebraic formalism for quantum
kinematics in the topos and a geometric counterpart to this. This internal duality
between algebra and geometry will rely on recent constructive versions of Gelfand-
Duality, due to Banaschewski and Mulvey (e.g. [1]), and of Riesz-Markov-Duality,
due to Coquand and Spitters ([14]) as well as on a less recent constructive version
of Stone duality.
4.3.1 Algebra
4.3.1.1 Observables Given a Von Neumann algebra A, we would like to de-
fine an object in SetV(A) that will represent this algebra. Note that we have a
tautological object74
V(A) A - CStar
A ≤ A′ - A ⊂ A′.
Recall the following elementary result from categorical model theory.
Lemma 1 (e.g. [31], Corollary D1.2.14). Let T be a geometric theory and let C be
a small category. Then
T−Mod(SetCop) - T−Mod(Set)Cop
P - ev−(P )
defines an isomorphism of categories.
Proof. The notation in the lemma for what is basically the identity functor is sup-
posed to suggestive. Indeed, note that for each C ∈ Cop we have a geometric
morphism SetC
op evC−→ Set with inverse image evaluation at C and right adjoint
S 7→ SC(C,−). This shows that evaluation induces a functor T −Mod(SetCop) −→
T −Mod(Set)Cop (which is obviously injective on objects and faithful). Moreover,
the set of points (evC)C∈C is separating. This implies that it is surjective on objects
and full.
Since we have a geometric (even algebraic) theory of commutative rings, A is
an internal commutative ring in SetV(A). We would actually like to say that this
is an internal C*-algebra75, so we can apply an internal version of Gelfand-Duality
later. However, since metric completeness is typically a second order property, a
theory of C*-algebras will be second order, hence we cannot use the above lemma
to conclude this. To prove this, one has to get one’s hands dirty and write out the
sheaf semantics. This was done in [29].
74Recall from theorem 4.5 that the pair (V(A),A) contains the same information as Π(A) and
therefore, by our discussion in paragraph 3.3.2, one should be able to reconstruct A from it.
75We might even want to say that it is an internal Von Neumann algebra. However, it is
very involved to work out what that would mean. In section 4.3.1.3 we shall see that the internal
Boolean algebra associated to A is complete and in section 4.3.2.3 we see that the internal Gelfand
spectrum of A is in fact the internal Stone spectrum of this Boolean algebra. This strongly suggest
that A is at least an internal AW*-algebra.
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Theorem 4.15 (Essentially [29], theorem 5). Any presheaf of commutative C*-
algebras in cCStarC
op
, for some category C, is an internal C*-algebra in SetCop ,
under the operations inherited from the pointwise ones. In particular, it is an in-
ternal vector space over the constant functor ∆C : c 7→ C (the Cauchy complex
numbers).
The process of passing from the non-commutative C*-algebra A to this internal
commutative one is known as Bohrification in literature. Again, as one might
expect, the observables are given by the self-adjoint elements.
Theorem 4.16. The object of observables Asa is given by Asa(A) = Asa.
Proof. We define Asa := {a ∈ A | a∗ = a } ⊂ A. This is immediate from the
interpretation of sheaf semantics in a presheaf category.
4.3.1.2 States Now we have given this internal representation of the algebra of
observables, we would like to do something similar for the states.
Definition 9 (Internal State). We define an internal state on an internal C*-algebra
A in a topos to be a C 76-linear map A I−→ C , such that I(1) = 1 and I(aa∗) ≥ 0
for all generalised elements a ∈ A.
We have the following correspondence.
Theorem 4.17 ([29]). There is a natural bijection between external quasi-states on
A and internal states on A. Therefore, if A does not have summands to type I2
external states on A are in natural bijection with internal states on A.
Proof. The first statement is almost tautological. Indeed, any quasi-state defines an
internal state by restriction to commutative subalgebras. Conversely, each internal
state ω defines a quasi-state ω by setting ω(a) = ωA(a), where A is some commu-
tative subalgebra containing a. This is well-defined by naturality of ω. Naturality
of this bijection is immediate. The second statement is just theorem 4.2.
4.3.1.3 Propositions Since we already have an internal structure representing
our observables, it is easy to also obtain one for the quantum propositions.
Definition 10. V(A) Π(A)−→ Set is the subfunctor of A that sends a commutative
C*-algebra A to its Boolean algebra Π(A) of self adjoint idempotents.
Note that this is an internal Boolean algebra in SetV(A), by lemma 1, since the
theory of Boolean algebras is geometric (even algebraic). Its operations are induced
by the those on Π(A), for A ∈ V(A). Moreover, combining the fact that each Π(A)
is a complete Boolean algebra with an argument along the lines of 4.8, one shows
that Π(A) is in fact complete.
4.3.1.4 State-Proposition Pairing Let A ω−→ ∆C be an internal state. We
note that this restricts to a map Π(A) ω−→ ∆[0,1]. As one might expect, we can
recover our state from this. For comparison with the contravariant approach, we
interpret this map Π(A) ω−→ ∆[0,1] a bit differently.
Theorem 4.18 ([28]). There is a natural bijection between:
1. External quasi-states on A;
76The Cauchy complexes.
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2. Internal states on A;
3. External finitely additive77 measures on Π(A).
4. Internal finitely additive measures on Π(A).
Proof. The equivalence between 1. and 2. has already been established in theorem
4.17. The equivalence between 1. and 3. is the affirmative answer to the quite non-
trivial Mackey-Gleason problem. (Theorem 3.11.) The equivalence between 3. and
4. is a consequence of the fact that an internal valuation on a Boolean algebra takes
values in the Dedekind reals [0, 1] ⊂ [0, 1]
l
(i.e. the constant presheaf [0, 1]). This
assertion is lemma 24 in [28]. Then, note that naturality of an internal measure µ
precisely means that µ
A
(p) = µ
A′
(p) if p ∈ Π(A) ∩Π(A′).
Like in the contravariant approach, we can define a pairing between states and
propositions that will yield truth values in Sub(1) ∼= ΓΩ. We simply mirror what
we do there. For each (quasi-)state ω, we have a map
Π(A) ω ◦ δ
i
- HomPos(V(A), [0, 1])
p -
(
A 7→ ω(δi(p)A)
)
.
Again, we introduce a ‘dichotomy map’ that will regard the probabilities that quan-
tum mechanics normally produces (by the Born rule) from an all or nothing point
of view. We define
[0, 1]
l
Dich - Ω
HomPos(V(A), [0, 1]) = [0, 1]
l
(A)
DichA - Ω(A) = P(↑ A)
ν - {A′ ∈↑ A | ν(A′) = 1 }.
Taking the composition of these maps we find our truth assignment
Π(A) truthω := ΓDich ◦ ω ◦ δ
i
- ΓΩ ∼= Sub(1).
4.3.2 Geometry
4.3.2.1 Observables Seeing that we have an internal commutative C*-algebra
in our topos, one might hope to realise this algebra as an algebra of functions of
some ‘internal space’ by using Gelfand-Naimark duality. However, the conventional
proof of the theorem relies on the axiom of choice78. Since our topos is (generally)
non-Boolean79, we see that the internal axiom of choice fails.
Not all is lost, however, since Banaschewski and Mulvey (and finally Coquand
and Spitters) gave a constructive proof of the theorem in a series of recent papers.
Their version of the theorem constructs the Gelfand spectrum not as a compact
Hausdorff space, but as a compact completely regular locale. To make sense of this,
recall that the categories CHaus of compact Hausdorff spaces and of KRegLoc of
compact completely regular locales are equivalent in presence of the axiom of choice.
77[28] states this result with finitely addtive replaced by countably additive and their proof skips
over many details. I could see that this would be true if a strong version of Gleason’s theorem
holds. However, one would certainly have to exclude I2 summands to have such a result at one’s
disposal.
78For instance, the Stone-Weierstrass theorem, that is invoked in the proof, does so.
79Recall that a presheaf topos is Boolean if and only if its site is a groupoid. Our site is a
(generally) non-trivial poset.
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Theorem 4.19 (Constructive Gelfand-Naimark,[1, 13]). For any Grothendieck
topos E, we have an equivalence of categories
cCStar(E)op
C(−,C )

Max
KRegLoc(E),
where C denotes the internal locale80 of Dedekind complex numbers, C(−,−) de-
notes the internal continuous Hom (a subfunctor of the internal Hom, defined in
terms of the internal language), and Max is the functor that sends an internal com-
mutative C*-algebra to the locale of maximal ideals (defined in terms of the internal
language of E)81. In particular, we can view
Asa ∼= C(Max(A),R),
where R is the locale82 of Dedekind real numbers.
At the moment, this internal spectrum is a rather abstract thing at the moment.
If it should be of any use for physicists, we had better give a more explicit descrip-
tion of it. For this purpose, we shall view it as a bundle of locales (in Set). For
convenience, we shall write Σ∗ := Max(A). The reader is encouraged to compare it
with the internal locale Σ∗ from the contravariant approach.
Analogous to what we did for the contravariant approach, referring to the com-
parison lemma, we will make the identification SetV(A) ∼= Sh(V(A)), where V(A)
is equipped with the Alexandroff topology83 here. We do this since we have a nice
desciption of locales internal to localic toposes, namely,
Loc(Sh(X)) ∼= Loc/X.
As was computed in [30], these identifications give us the following bundle of locales,
representing Σ∗.
Definition 11 ((Covariant) spectral bundle). Let Σ∗ be the topological space with
underlying set {(A, λ)|A ∈ V(A), λ ∈ Max(A) } and opens U ⊂ Σ∗ such that, when
we write UA := U ∩Max(A),
1. ∀A ∈ V(A) : UA ∈ OMax(A);
2. If A ⊂ A′, then λ′ ∈ UA′ whenever λ′|A ∈ UA.
Let us endow V(A) with the Alexandroff topology (consisting of the upper sets).
Then it is straightforwardly verified that the projection map
Σ∗ pi−→ V(A)
is continuous. We shall call this map the spectral bundle.
Writing out the identifications we made above, we get the following simple de-
scription of the internal Gelfand spectrum, in terms of the spectral bundle.
Corollary 4.20. As an object of Sh(V(A)), Σ∗ has the frame of opens
U
OΣ∗ - OΣ∗|U
U ⊂ V - (W 7→W ∩ U).
80In our specific case, its corresponding frame is O(C ) is given by O(C )(A) = O(↑ A × C ),
where ↑ A ⊂ V(A) is equipped with the subspace topology. [29]
81The interested reader can find an account of its action on morphisms in [37].
82In our case O(R)(A) = O(↑ A× R) ∼= HomPos(↑ A,O(R)).
83This consists of the upper sets.
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As an object of SetV(A), Σ∗ has the frame of opens
A
OΣ∗ - OΣ∗|↑A
A ≤ A′ - (W 7→W∩ ↑ A′).
Note that by interpreting the internal spectra in both approaches as bundles
of locales, we are able to compare them, even though they were internal locales in
different toposes to start out with.
We may have a reasonable idea of what the internal spectrum looks like now, but
the whole operation seems a tad pointless if we do not know how actual physical
observables should relate to it. It is somewhat unfortunate that there seems to be
no obvious way of interpreting observables as global sections of C(Max(A),R), i.e.
as elements of the external continuous homset C(Max(A),R). In [29], the authors
were able, however, to find a reasonable injection Asa ↪−→ C(Max(A), IR), where
IR denotes the internal Scott interval domain, another kind of real numbers object.
In analogy with the contravariant approach, they dubbed this map ‘daseinisation’
as well.
This interval domain IR (in Set) as a poset is defined as the set of all non-empty
compact intervals of real numbers ordered by inclusion. Like any preorder, this can
be endowed with the Scott topology. The closed subsets are the lower sets that are
closed under suprema of directed subsets. The collection
(p, q)S := {[r, s] | p < r ≤ s < q}, p, q ∈ Q, p < q,
is a basis for this topology. We have a continuous embedding
R
{·}
↪−→ IR
r 7→ [r, r].
We shall be using a variant of the covariant daseinsisation map that was in-
troduced by Wolters in [43]. This is obtained from the map in [29] by replac-
ing the (usual) order on Asa by the spectral order. We have made this choice
on the one hand because it is compatible with the ordinary Gelfand transform
A
ηA−→ C(Max(A),C ) in the sense that for all a ∈ A, if we write (a) for the
(commutative) subalgebra generated by a,
Σ∗|↑(a)
δ(a)- IR
R.
{·}
∪
6
η
(a) -
On the other hand, it will turn out that by making this choice, the resulting way
of constructing propositions out of observables and intervals coincides with the one
described in section 3.3.2. (See theorem 4.30.)
Definition 12. We define the covariant daseinisation map to be the function
(which is easily seen to be injective, by injectivity of the (inner and outer) da-
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seinisation)
Asa ⊂ δ - C(Σ∗, IR)
a -
(
Σ∗
δ(a) - IR
)
(A, λ) - [λ(δi(a)A), λ(δo(a)A)].
One can also define the interval domain internal to SetV(A), for instance as an
internal locale, by using the internal language. (See [43] for an explicit description.)
The specifics do not matter too much here. The result is, however, that we also
find a map Asa δ−→ C(Σ∗, IR).
We will use this covariant daseinisation map to construct elementary proposi-
tions out of the combination of an observable and a subset of the outcomes.
4.3.2.2 States As might be expected, there is also a geometric interpretation to
be given to states. This will precisely reflect the one given by Riesz-Markov duality
in classical kinematics. However, to avoid having to introduce the pointless extra
definition of an ‘internal Borel sigma-algebra associated to an internal locale’, we
note that finite regular measures on the Borel sigma algebra correspond precisely
with completely additive measures on the frame of open sets (where regularity of the
measure corresponds with the complete additivity). This motivates the following
definition.
Definition 13 (Probability valuation on an internal frame F ). We call a map
F
µ−→ [0, 1]l84 a probability valuation or a completely additive measure85 if
1. µ(>) = 1;
2. µ(x) + µ(y) = µ(x ∧ y) + µ(x ∨ y);
3. µ(
∨
i∈I xi) =
∨
i∈I µ(xi), for any directed set (xi)i∈I .
As was recently proved by Coquand and Spitters, the Riesz-Markov theorem
holds in any (elementary) topos. We formulate a weak version of it86.
Theorem 4.21 (Constructive Riesz-Markov,[14]). For any commutative C*-algebra
A internal to a Grothendieck topos E, there is a natural bijection between internal
states on A and probability valuations on O(Max(A)).
This gives yet another characterisation of states in the covariant approach (c.f.
theorem 4.18): as internal probability valuations O(Max(A)) µ−→ [0, 1]l. Again,
these are uniquely determined by their global sections O(Σ∗) ∼= O(Max(A))
µ=Γµ−→
HomPos(V(A), [0, 1]). The reader is encouraged to note the similarities with both
classical kinematics and the contravariant approach.
However, the analogy with classical mechanics fails in the sense that, here, pure
states are not derived from points of the space. Indeed, we have the following
reformulation of the Kochen-Specker theorem.
84Here [0, 1]l denotes the unit intervals in the lower reals (in the topos).
85c.f. definition 7.
86i.e. one not taking into account the structure of the space of valuations as a locale and
immediately combining it with Gelfand-Naimark.
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Theorem 4.22 ([16], [29]). Suppose A is a Von Neumann algebra with no type I1
and I2 summands. Then, the internal Gelfand spectrum Max(A) in SetV(A) does
not have any points as an internal locale.
Proof (sketch). The idea is that a point87 ∗ ρ−→ Max(A) defines a map A −→
pt(C ) ∼= C , that turns out to restrict to a *-homomorphism on each commutative
subalgebra, i.e. a map that cannot exist by the Kochen-Specker theorem. (The
converse is easy to see.) Indeed, such a point defines a map C((MaxA),C ) −→
C(∗,C ). Recall that A ∼= C((MaxA),C ), to see that we get a map A −→ C(∗,C ).
That is, in components, compatible maps A −→ C for all A ∈ V(A). It can be
shown that these are *-homomorphisms. (This is quite non-trivial.) As we know,
these cannot exist by the Kochen-Specker theorem.
We also have a reformulation of the Kochen-Specker theorem in terms of the
spectral bundle.
Theorem 4.23 ([16],[29]). Suppose A is a Von Neumann algebra with no type I1
and I2 summands. Then, the bundle Σ∗ −→ V(A) does not admit global sections88
(as maps of locales even).
Proof. The idea is that under the identification Loc(Sh(X)) ∼= Loc/X points of
an internal locale on the left hand side correspond with sections of the bundle of
locales on the right hand side. Indeed, a point of an internal locale L in Sh(X) is a
map of internal frames Ω −→ OL and Ω corresponds to the frame map O(X) id−→
O(X) = Ω(X) under this correspondence. We have already shown that the internal
spectrum is an internal locale with no points.
Remark 4.24. As far as we know, this result appeared first in [30]. However, that
proof rests on the claim (that is not explained further) that every section of the
bundle as a map of locales comes from a section as a map of topological spaces.
Seeing that the spaces V(A) and Σ∗ are sober if and only if V(A) is co-well-founded
(every non-empty subset has a maximal element), this claim is not immediately
obvious to the author. Note however that it does arise as a corollary of this result.
4.3.2.3 Propositions The following result of [28] gives us to hope that we will
be able to give a construction of the internal quantum phase space only using
the quantum logic, as opposed to the original construction as the internal Gelfand
spectrum of the internal commutative C*-algebra of quantum observables.
Theorem 4.25. The Gelfand spectrum O(Max(A)) of a commutative Rickart C*-
algebra89 A is isomorphic to the frame Spec(Π(A)) of ideals of Π(A).
We would like to go one step further than [28] and interpret the consequences of
this result internally in our topos. To be precise we are going to apply internal Stone
duality90 to the internal Boolean algebra Π(A) to obtain another internal locale,
87Here ∗ denotes the terminal internal locale, i.e. the one with corresponding frame the subobject
classifier.
88A mathematician might wonder what the added value is of stating the result like this. Such
a form of the result is appealing to a physicist since it resembles a very fundamental phenomenon
from (Yang-Mills) gauge theory, called Gribov ambiguity. There, the fact that a certain principal
bundle does not admit global sections (i.e. is non-trivial) results in the impossibility of making a
global choice of gauge (that would fix the value of observables). We have a similar phenomenon
here: we cannot globally fix the value of all observables. Regardless of the (mathematical) struc-
tural similarity, however, the physical origin of the effects are very different.
89For our purposes the following is a practical definition: a commutative C*-algebra whose
Gelfand spectrum is Stone and whose Boolean algebra of projections is countably complete. [3]
90Stone duality holds constructively if one is satisfied with the Stone space as a locale. (Recall
that one needs the Boolean prime ideal theorem, a weak form of AC, to construct the points of
the Stone spectrum.)
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which, fortunately, coincides with our internal Gelfand spectrum. This means that
we can recover A from Π(A), as the object of continuous functions to C on its
internal Stone spectrum.
Theorem 4.26 (Constructive Stone-Duality,[32]). For any (elementary) topos E,
we have an equivalence of categories
Bool(E)op
Compl

Spec
Stone(E),
where we write Bool(E) for the category of internal Boolean algebras and homo-
morphisms and Stone(E) for the category of internal Stone locales91 and continuous
functions and where Compl sends Σ to the Boolean algebra of complemented ele-
ments of OΣ and Spec sends a Boolean algebra B to its internal frame of ideals.
Proof. Noting that the finite elements of a regular frame (0-dimensionality implies
regularity) are precisely the complemented ones, this is an easy corollary of Corollary
II.3.3 in [32].
Corollary 4.27. The internal Gelfand spectrum Max(A) of A coincides with the in-
ternal Stone spectrum92 Spec(Π(A)) of Π(A). Put differently93, Π(A) ∼= Compl(Max(A)) =
{U ∈ OMax(A) |U ∨ ¬U = >}.
Proof. Let A ∈ V(A). Then, we already know that Max(A)(A) = Max(A). [30]
Moreover, by noting that every Von Neumann algebra is a Rickart C*-algebra ([28])
we see from theorem 4.25 that O(Max(A)) ∼= Spec(Π(A)). So we have to show that
the internal Stone spectrum of Spec(Π(A))(A) ∼= Spec(Π(A)). The following lemma
therefore does the rest. (We do not have to worry about their actions on morphisms,
as both are subfunctors of P(A).)
Lemma 2. Let L be an internal lattice in a topos SetP
op
of presheaves over a poset
P . Then the internal lattice of ideals is
(Spec(L))(C) = Spec(L(C)).
Proof. We compute Spec(L) by using the sheaf semantics of SetP
op
. (We use the
notation of [35].) Note Spec(L) := {I ∈ P(L) |φ(I) and ψ(I) and χ(I) }, where
φ(I) and ψ(I) are formulae
φ(I) := ∀i ∈ I ∀j ∈ L∃k ∈ I : i ∧ j = k,
ψ(I) := ∀i ∈ I ∀j ∈ I ∃k ∈ I : i ∨ j = k
and
χ(I) := ∃k ∈ I : ⊥ = k.
Now, I ∈ (Spec(L))(C) iff C  φ(I) ∧ ψ(I) ∧ χ(I) iff
∀D ≤ C ∈ P ∀i ∈ I(D)∀E ≤ D ∈ P ∀j ∈ L(E)∃k ∈ (I|E)(E) : (i|E) ∧E j = k,
91i.e. zero dimensional compact locales
92This shows that probably (at least, if we are working with a Von Neumann algebra) the internal
Gelfand spectrum should not be viewed as an analogue of the classical phase space. It is a Stone
space and therefore 0-dimensional. (So in particular, we hardly expect to formulate any kind of
dynamics on it.) We should rather view it as the quantum analogue of the Gelfand spectrum of
the universal enveloping Von Neumann algebra of the continuous functions on our classical phase
space, i.e. its hyperstonean cover. If we are really looking for a ‘quantum phase space’, we might
want to look for a characterisation of C(X) in its universal enveloping Von Neumann algebra, find
the analogous C*-subalgebra of B(H) and study its internal Gelfand spectrum.
93Here, Compl(Max(A)) denotes the internal Boolean subalgebra of OMax(A) consisting of the
complemented elements.
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∀D ≤ C ∈ P ∀i ∈ I(D)∀E ≤ D ∈ P ∀j ∈ (I|D)(E)∃k ∈ (I|E)(E) : (i|E) ∨E j = k,
and
∃k ∈ I(C) : ⊥C = k.
This requires some explanation. Here I ∈ PL(C), so by the Yoneda lemma it
corresponds to a unique arrow yC −→ PL and by the exponential adjunction to a
unique arrow yC×L −→ Ω. This arrow in turn corresponds with a unique subobject
of L|C = yC×L, which we also denote I. Note that since P is a poset yC(C ′) = ∗ if
C ′ ≤ C and empty otherwise. This explains our notation L|C . Similarly, with I|D
we mean I × yD. Therefore I|D(E) = I|E(E) = I(E). So our conditions reduce to
∀E ≤ D ≤ C ∈ P ∀i ∈ I(D)∀j ∈ L(E)∃k ∈ I(E) : (i|E) ∧E j = k,
∀E ≤ D ≤ C ∈ P ∀i ∈ I(D)∀j ∈ I(E)∃k ∈ I(E) : (i|E) ∨E j = k
and
∃k ∈ I(C) : ⊥C = k.
One easily verifies that these are equivalent to respectively
∀C ∈ P ∀i ∈ I(C)∀j ∈ L(C)∃k ∈ I(C) : i ∧E j = k,
∀C ∈ P ∀i ∈ I(C)∀j ∈ I(C)∃k ∈ I(C) : i ∨E j = k
and
∃k ∈ I(C) : ⊥C = k.
i.e. precisely the conditions stating that I(C) is an ideal of L(C).
One might wonder if this object Compl(Σ∗) could play an analogous role to
that of PclΣ in the contravariant approach. The answer is “no”. Indeed, note that
ΓCompl(Σ∗) is a Boolean algebra, since Compl(Σ∗) is an internal Boolean algebra
and the theory of Boolean algebras is algebraic. This means that, by theorem 4.3,
we cannot have a morphism Π(A) −→ ΓCompl(Σ∗) that preserves anywhere near
as much structure as the embedding of theorem 4.13 does.
The analogy does actually hold, but one has to choose the correct94 object of
‘clopen subobjects’ of Σ∗. Indeed, PclΣ is not the internal Boolean subalgebra of
OΣ∗ of complemented elements either. To correctly mirror the situation of the
contravariant approach, we define the following subfunctor of OΣ∗:
Clopen(Σ∗)(A) :=
{
D ∈ OΣ∗(A) | for all A′ ∈ V(A) : D ∩Max(A′) is closed
}
.
In particular, ΓClopen(Σ∗) shall play the role of SubclΣ:
ΓClopen(Σ∗) = {D ∈ OΣ∗ | for all A ∈ V(A) : D ∩Max(A) is closed} .
Mimicking theorem 4.13, we define
Π(A) - ΓClopen(Σ∗)
p - {λ ∈ Max(A) |λ(δi(p)A) = 1}.
Seeing that p ∈ A for some A ∈ V(A) and therefore δi(p)A = p for this A, we see
that this map is an injection and (literally) mirroring the proof of theorem 4.13 in
[17], we have
94The reader should note that the two options coincide in Set.
40
Theorem 4.28.
Π(A) ⊂ δ
i
- ΓClopen(Σ∗)
p - {λ ∈ Max(A) |λ(δi(p)A) = 1 }
defines an embedding95 of complete distributive inf-lattices (preserving ≤, 0, 1,∧).
Note that it does not also preserve ∨ in general, since it is a map from a non-
distributive lattice to a distributive one. However, ΓClopen(Σ∗) does have small
meets and
δi(p ∨ q) ≥ δi(p) ∨ δi(q).
Moreover, δi does not preserve the negation and ΓClopen(Σ∗) does in general not
satisfy the law of the excluded middle.
Finally, for each A ∈ V(A), it restricts to an order isomorphism
Π(A)
∼=
δi(A)
- Subcl(Max(A)).
One may wonder if we can define our states, like in theorem 4.14 of the con-
travariant approach, as finitely additive measures this set ΓClopen(Σ∗) of clopen
subobjects. This indeed works out and it even agrees with the restriction of our
probability valuations.
Theorem 4.29. For each quasi-state ω, one can define a finitely additive measure
µω on ΓClopen(Σ∗) by
µω(S)(A) := ω
(
δi(A)−1(S(A))
)
,
where δi(A) is the isomorphism Π(A) −→ ΓClopen(Σ∗) of theorem 4.28. In fact,
we can equivalently define states to be finitely additive measures on ΓClopen(Σ∗).
This abuse of notation is acceptable since this definition precisely coincides with the
restriction of the probability valuation µω on OΣ∗ defined by internal Riesz-Markov
duality.
Proof. We leave verification of the first statement to the reader. The second claim
follows by exactly the same proof as one uses in the contravariant approach. This
can be found in [18]. We examine the last claim.
We write µω for the probability valuation defined by the Riesz-Markov theorem
and derive that for S ∈ ΓClopen(Σ∗) the formula of the theorem holds. According
to Lemma 4.6 in [43], we have, for A ∈ V(A),
µω(S)(A) = sup{ω(p) | p ∈ Π(A), XAp ⊂ S(A)},
where XAp = {λ ∈ Max(A) |λ(p) > 0 }. Now, writing pS(A) := δi(A)−1(S(A)), note
that S(A) = {λ ∈ Max(A) |λ(pS(A)) = 1. Therefore, for each p over we take the
supremum of ω,
∀λ ∈ Max(A) : λ(p) > 0⇒ λ(pS(A)) = 1.
We see that the supremum is attained at p = pS(A), by noting that for all λ ∈
Max(A) there always exists a p ∈ Π(A) such that λ(p) > 0 and that for all λ ∈
Max(A) and p ∈ Π(A) λ(p) ≤ 1.
Finally, note that, according to Mackey-Gleason, every such measure also defines
a quasi-state by restricting along δi.
95Note that an injective (finite) inf-preserving morphisms is automatically an order embedding.
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Although this parallel with the contravariant approach is nice enough, the situa-
tion does not resemble classical mechanics one bit and that was the purpose of this
whole endeavour after all. The framework of [29] does not start with the Birkhoff-
Von Neumann quantum propositions from section 3.3.2 and embed them into some
topos-related logic. Rather, it builds propositions from the data of observables and
subsets of outcomes directly in their topos framework, imitating what we did in the
classical kinematics of section 3.3.1.
For an a ∈ C(Σ∗, IR) and ∆ ∈ OIR, they define a ‘proposition’
[a∆]cov := a
−1∆ ∈ OΣ∗.
If we are to regard this as a proposition, there had better be some relation with our
Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum propositions that had an actual motivation from
quantum physics and did not just arise in an attempt to push some analogy with
classical physics. Let us write [a∆]BN for the Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum
propositions from now on to make a clear distinction between the two notions. Then,
in [43], Wolters proved the following surprising result. (The proof is not particularly
complicated, but it is a rather long exercise in unraveling all the definitions.)
Theorem 4.30 ([43], essentially theorem 4.9). The way propositions are formed in
the covariant approach to quantum kinematics is compatible with the way the Born
rule dictates one should do it for Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum logic:
Asa ×O(R) ⊂δ × (−)S- C(Σ∗, IR)×O(IR)
OΣ∗
[−−]cov
?
Π(A)
[−−]BN
?
⊂
δi
- ΓClopen(Σ∗).
(−)
?
Here OΣ∗ (−)−→ ΓClopen(Σ∗) denotes the topological closure - the closure of an open
is again open as a consequence of the fact that the spectrum of a commutative Von
Neumann algebra is extremally connected, by theorem 3.7 - and (−)S denotes is the
restriction of the injection96
PR ⊂ (−)S - PIR
X - {[r, s] | [r, s] ⊂ X}.
Although this is a rather nice and surprising mathematical relation between the
two notions of proposition. We should verify that they indeed represent the same
idea physically. To do this, we study the state-proposition pairing and show that
they yield the same truth values when combined with an arbitrary state.
96This is a reasonable map to consider since it restricts to the map (r, s) 7→ (r, s)S between the
bases of the topologies. Also ({x})S = {{x}}, so it embodies the idea of the map R {·}−→ IR.
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4.3.2.4 State-Proposition Pairing From a geometric point of view, the state-
proposition pairing the covariant approach is very close to the one in the contravari-
ant approach. Recall our dichotomy map [0, 1]
l
Dich−→ Ω.
Each internal valuation µ on O(Max(A)) defines a map O(Max(A)) Dich◦µ−→ Ω.
Seeing that our quantum propositions were maps 1
p−→ O(Max(A)), in this frame-
work, we can take their composition to yield a truth value
1
Dich ◦ µ ◦ p
- Ω
or equivalently
1
ΓDich ◦ µ ◦ p- ΓΩ = Sub(1).
We say that a proposition p is true at context A for a state µ if ΓDich◦µ◦p(A) = 1.
Using this notion of truth, we have the following result.
Theorem 4.31 ([43],lemma’s 4.7 and 4.8 and theorem 4.9). As far as truth values
go, the two ways [−−]BN and [−−]cov of building propositions are equivalent. The
same holds for the algebraic and geometric ways of pairing states and propositions.
Let µ be a valuation OΣ∗ −→ HomPos(V(A), [0, 1]) (one of our generalised quantum
states). By theorems 4.21 and 4.18, we know that µ corresponds to some quasi-state
ωµ on A. Then, for A ∈ V(A), the following are equivalent.
1. ωµ(δ
i([a∆]BN )A) = 1;
2. µ(δi([a∆]BN ))(A) = 1;
3. µ([δ(a)∆S ]cov)(A) = 1;
4. µ([δ(a)∆S ]cov)(A) = 1.
Proof. Wolters only proves this for the case that ρ is a state. However, I see no
reason why his proof should not work for the general case.
If one likes to put it this way, for each (quasi-)state ω and each proposition, we
have a map97
Π(A) truthω- ΓΩ ∼= Sub(1),
where truthω(p)(A) is Dich
98 applied to the left hand side of any of the equations
in the above enumeration (and we have picked some description [a∆]BN = p).
4.3.3 Interpretation of Truth
Let us ask the same questions as in the contravariant approach.
1. How much information can we infer about ω from knowing truthω?
97The reader might have been expecting this to be defined as a map ΓClopenΣ∗ −→ Sub1,
hoping that this would be a lattice (or even Heyting) homomorphism for pure states ω. (The pure
states define homomorphisms to the truth values in classical kinematics.) Unfortunately, this does
not work out. As one can check, this map indeed preserves ∧, but not ∨. This is a consequence
of the fact that pure states do not define a one-point measure. (In the GNS-representation the
measure of a state |ψ〉 is defined by the inner product p 7→ 〈ψ|δi(p)|ψ〉.).
98[0, 1]
Dich−→ {0, 1}, (x < 1) 7→ 0, 1 7→ 1.
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2. How should we interpret these truth values?
Again truthω contains the same information as the support of ω. Therefore, in
this respect these ‘nuanced’ truth values are no better than those of the Birkhoff-Von
Neumann logic. The difference is to be sought in the truth value of one particular
proposition.
By definition truthω(p)(A) = 1 iff ω(δ
i(p)A) = 1, i.e. if with certainty the
proposition δi(p)A is true for ω (in the Birkhoff-Von Neumann sense). Seeing that
δi(p)A is the weakest antecedent that we can investigate in our classical context A
that would imply p, we can immediately say that p is true for ω if and only if there
exists an A such that truthω(p)(A) = 1. The way one should therefore think of
these propositions is with the intension of verification in mind.
Indeed, if δi(p)A is not true, this tells us nothing about the truth of p. However,
assume proposition p is true for state ω and we want to exhibit this with the
restriction that we are only allowed to perform measurements in classical context
A (because we want to avoid disturbing our system to much, say). Then, our best
option is to examine δi(p)A. If that turns out to be true, so was p. The way to
interpret truthω(p), therefore, is that it has a value 1 at context A if and only if we
can verify p by measuring observables from A.
Since the logical operations on the subobject lattice are computed pointwise, so
truth of δi(p) ∨ δi(p′) at A should be interpreted as possibility of verifying either p
or q by measuring observables from A and similarly for ∧. In particular, note that
there is no ambiguity as to which of the two experiments should be performed first,
since the propositions commute.
4.3.4 Summary
Summarising, we have set up a framework for quantum kinematics in the topos
SetV(A). This was built on the definition of the tautological internal C*-algebra
A and its internal Gelfand spectrum Σ∗. In terms of these objects, we defined re-
spectively both an algebraic and a geometric formalism internal to the topos that
deals with generalised kinds of observables, states and propositions, in which the
corresponding objects of ordinary quantum mechanics were embedded. This went
as follows.
Observables:
Asa ⊂ δ- C(Σ∗, IR) ∼= C(Σ∗, IR),
states:
S (A) ⊂ - Squasi(A) ∼= “internal states”(A) ∼= “finitely additive measures”(Π(A))
∼= “finitely additive measures”(Π(A))
∼=“finitely additive measures”(ΓClopen(Σ∗)) ∼= “valuations′′(Σ∗),
propositions:
Π(A) ⊂ δ
i
- ΓClopen(Σ∗) ⊂- ΓOΣ∗ ∼= OΣ∗.
This last map defines a inf-embedding of orders and it restricts to an order-isomorphism
between each Π(A) and Subcl(Max(A)), A ∈ V(A). This enlarged ‘quantum logic’
has the following properties.
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1. It is a complete Heyting algebra.
2. The interpretation of the (Heyting) negation is “p is not true”, rather than
“p is false”.
3. Each state determines the truth-value of all quantum propositions. This is a
consequence of our dichotomy-map that transformed probabilities into true-
false-judgements in each classical context. The truth values at different clas-
sical contexts have the immediate operational interpretation as possibility of
verification: a 1 means that verification is possible.
4. For pure states (and mixed states) the truth values fail to define lattice ho-
momorphisms ClopenΣ∗ −→ Sub1.
5. We have an inf-embedding of Π(A) into the complete Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ),
that, when restricted to any Boolean subalgebra of Π(A), defines an isomor-
phism of Boolean algebras to Subcl(Max(A))
6. The interpretation of ∨ is what we are used to: for a state |ψ〉, p∨ p′ can only
be true, if either p or p′ is true. However, the law of the excluded middle fails.
7. The propositions have a clear operational interpetation. The logical opera-
tions are defined pointwise so we are only combining commuting propositions
in conjunctions and disjunctions. The truth value of such combined propo-
sitions therefore does not depend on the order in which we verify the truth
value of the building blocks of this proposition.
8. We have a rather nice way of reconstructing the internal algebra A of observ-
ables from the ‘quantum logic’ Π(A). Namely, as the continuous functions on
its internal Stone spectrum.
4.4 Discussion
Recall that the primary motivation99 for attempting to give a topos theoretic de-
scription of quantum kinematics was to provide the ordinary quantitative proba-
bilistic formalism with a qualitative logical counterpart that was not so blunt in
its notion of truth as the Birkhoff-Von Neumann logic. Have these ambitions been
realised? Partly, I would say. Possibly more important is the byproduct100 of this
search for a suitable quantum logic: a framework for quantum kinematics that is
surprisingly similar to that of classical kinematics, except for the fact that it is set
up in a different topos than Set.
Let us recap what we have done in setting up the framework. Essentially, we
have restored the commutativity of the algebra and the distributivity of the logic
by giving our objects under consideration a more interesting internal structure.
Non-classical aspects of quantum kinematics are hidden in the indexing of objects
by the poset of classical contexts. In many cases, we were able to show that the
constructions from classical kinematics performed in the topos resulted in (slichtly)
generalised notions of quantum states, observables and propositions. In the covari-
ant approach, the topos contained a tautological internal commutative C*-algebra
99I should admit that [29] and [28] give an entirely different motivation for using toposes: a case
is made that we should expect quantum logic to be intuitionistic, since the law of excluded middle
cannot possibly hold, seeing that ignorance interpretation of quantum probabilities is unacceptable.
I am afraid to say that I do not entirely follow the reasoning and it leaves me with the impression
that the subtleties in the physical interpretation of the logical operations in the different logics are
not being fully appreciated.
100Here, of course, I am mostly speaking of the covariant approach.
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from which we managed to develop the whole framework in a way that was entirely
analogous to classical kinematics.
By applying daseinisation maps to approximate propositions in other classical
contexts, we managed to embed the Birkhoff-Von Neumann logic into a complete
Heyting algebra, regaining distributivity at the cost of the law of the excluded
middle and either the meet or the join.
We defined a new, more subtle notion of truth on these logics, giving a sep-
arate judgement in each classical context, the object of truth values being ΓΩ ∼=
Sub(1). In my opinion the best interpretation of truth values of propositions in
the contravariant and covariant approach is that they respectively contain the
(in)possibility of falsification and verification in different contexts. I have not seen
this interpretation of the truth of quantum propositions in the two approaches in
literature. The treatment of the issue is usually limited to a remark along the
following lines. Our new quantum propositions relate as follows to the Birkhoff-
Von Neumann ones. Contravariant propositions (not truth values) represent truths
about a system. Covariant propositions represent statements about the system that
one might try to verify (but that are not necessarily true) in each context to es-
tablish truth of the corresponding Birkhoff-Von Neumann quantum proposition. In
particular, truth of a proposition in the covariant sense in some context immediately
implies truth in every context in the contravariant approach101.
Unfortunately, the truth value maps corresponding to pure states did not pre-
serve the logical operations, thereby breaking the parallel with classical kinematics.
This, again, shows that pure quantum states are fundamentally different from pure
states in classical mechanics. They do not seem to be very susceptible to determin-
istic descriptions.
We conclude with a brief comparison of aspects of the two approaches to the sub-
ject. One should note that the intensions of the two approaches were initially very
different: where the contravariant approach seemed mostly to be looking for a good
notion of quantum logic (within their broader framework of topos approaches to
physics), the covariant approach focussed on stressing the parallel with classical
kinematics.
We can still see that this parallel is much more pronounced in the covariant
approach, mostly because there is both an algebraic and a geometric side to the
story, while the contravariant approach so far has resisted attempts to associate
a geometry to it. However, in recent work, notably [28] and [43], the logical side
of the covariant approach has been explored, mirroring all constructions from the
contravariant approach. As far as I can tell, this has been a big succes. One could
even say that the covariant approach now encompasses the contravariant one, with
the caveat that the logic has an interpretation in terms of verification rather than
falsification.
Interaction clearly has taken place between the two approaches. Even with that
in mind, however, it is quite striking that the two produce such similar results,
given their completely different origins. This might show that, even though the
constructions employed are a bit uncommon for the standard of physics, they can
hardly be complete non-sense.
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